

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY: THE PROS AND CONS OF EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION

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Comments are welcome**

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‘When *I* use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less’. ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master—that’s all’. (Lewis Carroll: *Through the Looking Glass*)ⁱ

I. SECURITY IN THE INTER-DISCIPLINARY BATTLE

Until fairly recently, the term ‘security’ was almost monopolized by the academic discipline of International Relations (IR). IR theorists employed it in a rather narrow sense which happened to correspond to the way politicians tended to use the word, i.e. as almost synonymous with military power. The more military power, or rather the more favourable the military balance, the more security.

Surprisingly little was, however, written about security by the IR theoreticians, in the works of whom ‘national interest’ and/or ‘power’ were preferred, sometimes as alleged synonyms of security. In his seminal work on Realism, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define ‘security’ⁱⁱ. Arnold Wolfers was one of the few who ventured a definition of the term:

‘security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.’ⁱⁱⁱ

In contrast to IR, peace research in general, and Johan Galtung in particular, have for decades endeavoured to develop meaningful conceptions of peace, security and violence. Both Galtung’s term ‘positive peace’ and the late Kenneth Boulding’s ‘stable peace’ could thus be seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded security concept^{iv}. For ‘security’ to be meaningful and durable, it would have to amount to a positive or stable peace structure. This would imply considerably more than negative peace equated with an absence of war, as merely one particular form of ‘direct violence’. Genuine peace and security would presuppose an elimination of, or at least a reduction of, ‘structural violence’, i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world population.

Belatedly, members of the IR community have come to accept the challenge of developing broader conceptions of security^v, with Barry Buzan and his collaborators at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI (but *not* the present author) belonging to theoretical vanguard by virtue of their analyses of national and ‘societal’ security^{vi}. However, while acknowledging the need for shifting the focus from the (now defunct) East-West conflict and military matters^{vii}, most members of the ‘strategic studies’ (now often re-labelled ‘security studies’) community continue to fight a rearguard battle against what they regard as an inappropriate expansion of the concept of ‘security’. Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain widening, disagreement persists about where to draw the line.

As will be argued in the following (and in line with Humpty Dumpty’s linguistic philosophy) there is no ‘correct’ answer to questions such as this. It is a matter of definitions,

which may be more or less useful or relevant, but neither right nor wrong. To expand the notion of security too far—say, to include the absence of all types of problems—would not be practical, since it would merely create the need for an additional term for ‘traditional security’, now relegated to being merely one species of the genus ‘security’. Not to widen the concept at all might, on the other hand, relegate ‘security studies’ to a very marginalized position, if (as seems likely) traditional security problems will be perceived as having a sharply diminishing salience.

Moreover, constructivists are probably right in rejecting as futile the quest for concepts that are ‘correct’ in the sense of corresponding to reality, if only because this ‘reality’ is itself socially constructed, *inter alia* by means of concepts such as ‘peace’ and ‘security’. What the analyst, who is part of the game himself, can do is to analyze how concepts are used, and how the security discourse is evolving. As argued by Ole Wæver and others to thus analyze the entire security discourse as a complex ‘speech act’ challenges the analyst to explore the ‘securitization’ of issues, which may have political implications. Among other advantages, this approach induces caution with regard to elevating too many problems to the status of ‘security problems’. In the political discourse, to call something a ‘security problem’ may be (ab)used for a ‘tabooization’ of issues and marginalization of ideological opponents. To label something as important to national security is often almost tantamount to declaring it ‘off limits’, i.e. not a legitimate subject for political or academic debate. Hence, a relevant political goal might be a ‘de-securitization’ of pertinent issues, which may allow for a more open and fruitful debate.^{viii}

II. THE NARROW CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND ITS EXTENSIONS

What characterized the traditional IR approach to ‘security’, especially during the era of almost unchallenged dominance of Realism^{ix}, was the focus on the state as the referent object of security. Even though the preferred term was ‘national’ security, this was thus a misnomer when applied globally and only appropriate in those exceptional cases where nation and state happened to be (almost) coterminous.^x

What the Realists were really referring to was the security of the territorial (rather than nation-) state, which was indeed the principal actor in their ‘Westphalian’ universe. It was presumed (if only ‘for the sake of the argument’) to be both universal and perennial, when in fact it was neither.^{xi} This international system was supposed to consist of anarchic and to consist of sovereign states, each pursuing its ‘national’ interest, ‘defined in terms of power’ or, somewhat more modestly, in terms of security in the sense of survival. Furthermore, this universe was characterized by strife, since the aforementioned national interests inevitably collided, hence the pervasiveness of competition, conflict and war.^{xii} Since states were thus inherently insecure, they were well advised to make sure their power would suffice to parry threats from other states to their sovereignty. As far as the system as such was concerned, the best safeguard of peace would presumably be a ‘balance of power’^{xiii}. As such balance is difficult to define and well nigh impossible to achieve or preserve, the system had an inherent propensity of for a competitive

arms build-up without any natural saturation point^{xiv}. To the extent that ‘balance’ was believed to be unattainable, nuclear deterrence was believed to serve as an equalizer, capable of providing a balance of sorts.^{xv}

As became increasingly obvious, this was not merely a very bleak (and probably incorrect) view of the world, but also one that pointed to a strategy that might all too easily become counterproductive. At the end of the day, nobody (except the military-industrial complex) benefitted from the armaments dynamics, but everybody suffered: in their role as taxpayers ordinary people suffered under the burden of military expenditures, and in their role as citizens they had to live under an ever-present (yet non-quantifiable) risk of nuclear holocaust.

As a predictable reaction, a partial innovation occurred in the early 1980s, connected with the term ‘Common Security’. The term was coined by Egon Bahr, and promulgated in the Palme Commission's 1982 report *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival*. Its main message (besides a number of concrete recommendations for arms control measures and the like) was that security under conditions of anarchy and high levels of armaments required ‘mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age’, in the absence of which ‘the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned’^{xvi}. Furthermore, ‘the security—even the existence—of the world [was acknowledged as] interdependent’, hence the admonition that ‘security can be attained only by common action’^{xvii}. Common Security was thus envisaged as a way of solving (or perhaps better: circumventing or transcending) the well-known ‘security dilemma’, about which so much has been written by IR scholars, not least by Realists^{xviii}.

The growing number of references to Common Security (occasionally called ‘security partnership’, ‘mutual security’, ‘reciprocal security’ or ‘cooperative security’) in political statements as well as in the academic literature was, unfortunately, not matched by any rigorous theoretical analysis of the implications of the concept^{xix}. Some (including the present author) advocated a rather ‘austere’ concept of Common Security, tantamount to little more than what might be called a ‘mutual restraint imperative’, presupposing neither an abandonment of competition or conflict in favour of cooperation (desirable though this might be), nor any institutionalization or codification. Thus conceived, Common Security would be little more than an special instance of ‘cooperation between adversaries’, i.e. a form of ‘regime’, entirely compatible with the teachings of both ‘soft Realism’, ‘liberal institutionalism’,^{xx} and the so-called ‘English School's’ notions of ‘international society’.^{xxi}

Thus conceived, ‘Common Security’ does not automatically entail any broader notion of security, but may signify little more than the same type of security, only to be achieved by other, less confrontational means. The state remains the referent object of security and the focus remains on threats from other states, including (or perhaps even primarily) military threats, against which military counters continue to be deemed warranted. The associated concept of ‘non-offensive defence’ (NOD) may thus best be understood as a military strategy intended as a functional substitute for prevailing military strategies, only without their negative repercussions.

It is intended as an instrument for states acting within an international system resembling that of the Realists: dominated by territorial states which are presumed to be pursuing their national interests within an anarchic setting and in (at least latent) conflict with each other. By abstaining from offensive capabilities, however, the security dilemma may presumably be evaded and, as a longer-term perspective, transcended. War might thus eventually become inconceivable, thus also rendering NOD obsolete, along with all other military strategies.^{xxii}

Other Common Security proponents, however—among whom most of the staff of Egon Bahr's peace research institute in Hamburg—have sought to subsume a very broad panoply of proposals under Common Security as an 'umbrella concept' encompassing collective security, disarmament, and the like, and being almost tantamount to a virtual denial of international conflict. Such advocacies have typically also emphasized the need for broader concepts of security, which should include e.g. Third World development, ecological security, etc. Laudable though such endeavours may be in principle, only little has been accomplished so far in terms of rigorous theoretical analysis^{xxiii}.

Another extension of the traditional concept of security, which has been around for decades, yet seems to be attracting growing attention in the post-Cold War era, is that of 'Collective Security' which is both more and less radical than (some versions of) CS. Less radical in the sense of being conceived of as a counter to the traditional state-versus-state military threats, yet more radical by envisaging a transfer of powers from the state to international authorities, i.e. a partial relinquishment of sovereignty. Whereas collective security was until recently dismissed as irrelevant by most of the IR community (because of its poor achievement in the inter-war years)^{xxiv}, it has been taken increasingly seriously in the post-Cold War era^{xxv}.

Moreover, to the extent that United Nations forces (or those of other international organizations, say the OSCE) are not 'merely' employed for restoring peace *between* states, but also *within* states, or for safeguarding human rights there, they might point towards a new international system: a 'new world order' that is no longer based on sovereign states with impermeable borders, but a truly global one in which 'international politics' is superseded by 'domestic politics of a global scale' ('*Weltinnenpolitik*').^{xxvi} However, it remains to be seen whether the isolated instances of 'humanitarian interventions' the world has seen so far are in fact harbingers of such a new order, or merely aberrations from 'business as usual' attributable to the confusion of the present transitional period. In either case, however, the theoretical implications are being analyzed extensively within the IR, peace research and strategic studies communities^{xxvii}. To the extent that such interventions can be legitimized as promoting security, it is surely no longer the security of the state, but of some other entity, which leads us directly to the next question:

III. WHOSE SECURITY?

A central premise for the question whether or not to expand the notion of security is whose security one is talking about, i.e. the referent object of security.

Some confusion arises from the fact that 'security' is both a *terminus technicus* of the academic discipline of IR as well as other academic disciplines, and a word in common usage. Whereas in the latter field it is regarded as natural that people, i.e. individuals, are either secure or insecure, the dominant brand of IR theory, i.e. Realism, has neglected this dimension and treated the state as the only appropriate referent object of security. The State, however, is an entity *sui generis*, which is often either portrayed as endowed with certain almost metaphysical characteristics or personified, i.e. treated as if it were an individual 'writ large'^{xxviii}. Neither the interests nor the will of the State are thus reducible to those of its citizens, but likewise *sui generis*. The State's security is, in the final analysis, only definable in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity.^{xxix}

This state-centred approach has been charged with neglecting the people, i.e. individual security, which is basically about well-being and, in the last analysis, survival. Thus conceived individual security may indeed be placed in jeopardy by an unrestrained quest for state security, say if the latter should involve war. Hence, for instance, the uncomfortable 'Red or dead' dilemma that haunted NATO (and especially Germany) for decades: should one sacrifice the survival of the population for such intangible values as sovereignty? Furthermore, is it ethically justifiable to kill other individuals for the sake of state interests, as would have been the implication of a breakdown of deterrence? According to a 'cosmopolitan' ethics^{xxx}, what really matters is the survival and well-being of the individuals, e.g. as the utilitarians formulated it: 'the greatest happiness principle'^{xxxi}. This may of course be compatible with, but only rarely presupposes, a defence of sovereignty. Moreover, for principled proponents of this view, state security can merely be a relevant goal to the extent that the state derives its powers from *la volonté generale*. If and when it ceases to represent the interests of its citizens, say when state security places individual security in jeopardy, the latter takes precedence^{xxxii}.

Whereas Realists and neorealists would tend to deny the importance of individual security, some of them would go as far as to acknowledge the relevance of an intermediary level, namely that of collectivities, such as ethnic groups or nations, even when they are not coterminous with the state. Hence the notion of 'societal security', more on which in due course. Suffice it at this point to mention that it is about 'identity'.

Whether to limit 'security' to the state level, or extend the term to the individual and/or societal level is a matter of arbitrary definition. Neither is more correct than the other, even though one definition may be more useful than others. In the following, I shall regard the three levels as equally important, but above all separate in the sense that neither can be reduced to the others^{xxxiii}.

Referent object	Content
The State	Sovereignty, power
Collectivities	Identity
Individuals	Survival, well-being

IV. DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

In what follows I shall attempt a survey of various ‘dimensions’ of security in the wider sense, namely political, economic, societal, and environmental or ecological security, whilst bypassing the military dimension dealt with above. As will become apparent, the various threats listed under these heading do not apply (at least not to the same extent) to the three levels. As the concluding section will show, however, all of them are included in the new political discourse on security.

A. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

The political dimension of security has several different aspects, some of which concern the relationship between the state and ‘its’ citizens, while others have to do with the political aspects of international relations.

Even though the state was presumably ‘created’ for the sake of its citizens' security, it can also constitute a threat to their security. In Hitler's Germany or Pol Pot's Kampuchea, the life of man was certainly at least as ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ as it was in the proverbial ‘state of nature’ before the erection of any state structures^{xxxiv}. Too strong and oppressive ‘Leviathans’ may thus constitute security threats in their own right, as acknowledged by at least some IR writers, even by some of the Realist or neo-realist persuasion^{xxxv}.

The main security problem today may, however, not be an excess but a deficit of strength. Most states in the Third World are thus ‘weak states’ in which there is a ‘dissonance between the loci of authority and power’ (Mohammed Ayoob), and where society and state boundaries are far from coterminous, *inter alia* as a reflection of the colonial legacy. Hence the lack of legitimacy of the state and regime and the perpetual struggle for control of the state apparatus and for autonomy or cessation^{xxxvi}—a struggle which all too often assumes violent forms. The resultant armed conflicts may already be the most prevalent form of war (say, measured in terms of numbers of violent deaths) and will most likely become so in the coming years, where ‘Hobbesian wars’ (*bellum omnium contra omnes*) may almost supercede the ‘Clausewitzian wars’ fought by states against other states^{xxxvii}.

As far as the interstate level is concerned, it has long been claimed by proponents of a traditional approach to security that the security problem is neither about weapons nor about military matters at all. This claim has, more often than not, been used as an attempted rebuttal of the critics of nuclear deterrence. However, even though the claim is of course correct, it does not follow that weapons are of no importance. Be that as it may, according to these ‘traditionalists’ the real conflict was one of values, i.e. an ideological confrontation between the incompatible value systems of capitalism (equated with democracy) and communism (equated with totalitarianism). It should therefore come as no surprise that the anti-communist, democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (followed by the dissolution of the latter) spurred a renewed interest in the old notion that democracy serves as a powerful inhibition against war. Even though the simplistic thesis that ‘democracies are peaceful’ does not stand up to closer scrutiny, the qualified formulation that ‘democracies do not wage wars of aggression against other democracies’ seems well-founded, and is at least consistent with historical facts—with the American Civil War standing out as the only major exception from the general rule not accounted for^{xxxviii}.

This observation has led what one might call the ‘triumphalists’ or ‘endists’ (most prominently Francis Fukuyama) to foretell an ‘end of history’ as a result of the universalization of the ‘western’ values of democracy, pluralism and market economy^{xxxix}. Others have been less sanguine and have pointed out the various flaws in democracy as practiced by the triumphant Western states, and have demanded additional democratization^{xl}. Be that as it may, few would contest the notion that democracy is a powerful antidote to bellicosity, and that a thoroughly democratic Europe (such as the one that we may well be approaching, even though we are not quite there yet) will most likely be peaceful. *A fortiori*, a democratization of the rest of the world would undoubtedly go a long way towards a more peaceful world. However, a caveat may be needed, lest the triumphalists have their way and attempt to export democracy and accompanying western values to the rest of the world, perhaps only in a well-intended quest for democratization. Logical though it might seem at first glance, to go to war for the sake of imposing democracy would be most unwise, indeed merely a new variety of the well-known phenomenon of the alleged ‘war to end all wars’.^{xli}

B. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

‘Economic security’^{xlii} may mean (at least) two rather different things. Either, it may be understood narrowly as the economic foundations of military power; or, it may be seen as an aspect or dimension of security in its own right.

The former interpretation is based on the common sense observation that economic power is eminently ‘fungible’ in the sense that it may be transformed into almost anything, depending of course on the time perspective and preconditioned on a functioning world market. Money may buy a state weapons from abroad, and it may increase productivity, thus allowing

for a transfer of labour from the civilian sphere into that of arms production or armed service. In the final analysis, wealth is thus tantamount to mobilization potential, if not in the short term then at least in the medium to long run. According to this line of reasoning, the economic power of a nation inevitably constitutes a latent threat to its adversaries^{xliii}, hence the advisability of not contributing to the economic development of one's enemies or opponents, if need be even of embargoing trade with them. This was a very widespread view in the USA throughout the Cold War period, including the *détente* of the early seventies^{xliv}. Paradoxically, this view stands in sharp contradiction with the liberal view of international trade (Smith, Ricardo, etc.) which presumed trade to have beneficial effects on the war-proneness of the international system^{xlv}.

On the other hand, actual militarization (including the maintenance of standing armed forces, and of a 'follow-on system' of military production^{xlvi}) inevitably comes at the expence of the civilian economy. Paradoxically, excessive militarization now may thus damage mobilization potential at a later stage, since the latter ultimately reflects the state of the economy as a whole. According to several analysis, the high level of military expenditures in both the former superpowers, albeit most radically in the former Soviet Union, was counterproductive and, in the long run untenable. More generally, this would seem to affect great powers in the phase of decline that is inevitable sooner or later, but which becomes more painful and costly because of 'overextension', both politically and militarily^{xlvii}.

The latter interpretation, in its turn, comes in at least two different versions. First of all, economic warfare may be a functional substitute for the use of military power, just as military power may serve to cripple an adversary's economy, as in the case of blockades. However, even without the use of military might, starvation is a very powerful means of 'compellance' that might be (indeed has been) used with success to enforce a (bloodless, yet far from painless) surrender. As a reflection thereof, many states have striven for economic self-sufficiency as a means of security: by stockpiling 'strategic materials' as well as ordinary goods they may make themselves less vulnerable to economic warfare, hence more secure^{xlviii}.

Secondly, 'economic security' may mean invulnerability to economic hazards which need not be created deliberately by an adversarial state, but could well be 'structural', i.e. caused by the workings of the system, rather than by a specific (in this case malevolent) actor. There are at least three different approaches to enhancing economic security in this sense: autharky (a special species of the genus mercantilism), diversification and interdependence (including integration).

Autharky might conceivably enhance economic security, as preached by classical mercantilism. This was e.g. the strategy chosen by the USSR who regarded the world market as unsafe, not merely because it was controlled by hostile capitalist powers, but also because of its capitalist nature. Certain peace researchers (Galtung and others) have also advocated economic self-sufficiency as a (strictly defensive, hence preferable) for of defence, providing for invulnerability^{xlix}

Diversification, in the sense of a deliberate spreading of a state's dependencies between as many other states, and across as many fields, as possible, has been another traditional means of economic security. States that are dependent on one single (group of) supplier(s) for essential commodities, such as raw materials for its industry, are vulnerable to a cut-off of these supplies. States in the global 'periphery', which often have only one significant commodity to export, are, for instance, especially vulnerable to fluctuations of world market prices, as well as to political manipulations thereof, to say nothing of boycotts by their main customers¹.

The furthering of interdependence, even to the point of integration, is the third, and in several senses most 'modern' way of enhancing economic security. This is, e.g., the approach taken by the EU countries ever since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Communities^{li}. The underlying understanding has been that a web of mutual interdependencies would serve as a powerful inhibition against war, in perfect conformity with the aforementioned tenets of 'classical' liberalism, as well as with the writings of Norman Angell, and modern analysts of 'complex interdependence' (Keohane and Nye, among others)^{lii}. One might, indeed, call this the 'common security approach to economic security', since it is tantamount to a transcendence of the national boundaries with regard to the subject of security: The whole system is to be made more secure, hence also its members, who could not achieve the same level of security through their individual efforts^{liii}.

C. THE SOCIETAL DIMENSION

Whereas Realists have focused their attention on the level of the state as the only proper referent object of 'security', 'Idealists' (including a large part of the peace research 'movement') have maintained that people, i.e. individuals, are what really matters in the final analysis. State security may be worth striving for, but only to the extent that it contributes to the security, i.e. survival and well-being, of people. The state is, at most, a means but never an end in itself. To thus focus on the lowest level, somewhat paradoxically, inevitably also draws attention to the highest level, namely that of Mankind as a whole, i.e. the great community of individuals, irrespective of citizenship. Individual and global security are thus two sides of the same coin, as argued by proponents of 'human security'^{liv}.

As mentioned above, some have taken an intermediate position, wishing to deny the field of security studies to the proponents of individual/global security (also because it would tend to blur the contours of security studies as an academic discipline), while agreeing with them that the state level is too narrow. Hence the need for a collective, yet non-state referent object of security, conceived of as collectivities, the security of which is termed 'societal security'. In the seminal, work on the topic societal security is defined as

¹...the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for

evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.^{lv}

Thus defined, it becomes obvious that much of the recent discourse about ‘risks’ (as opposed to ‘threats’ is really about societal security. Of course, the various societal developments referred to also impinge on the state level in various ways, yet to make this their ‘admission ticket’ into the field of ‘security problems’ often becomes far-fetched.

Run-away population growth has been singled out by some authors as perhaps the most serious security problem for the decades ahead^{lvi}, if only because of the ‘Malthusian’ implications of a growing discrepancy between the available resources for consumption and the much faster growing number of would-be consumers. This might be a security problem in its own right, particularly of course for the losers in the competition for scarce resources, but also with security implications for the winners.

It might, for instance, become a societal security problem for the North if resource depletion in the South should lead to a tidal wave of migration to the North^{lvii}. Whereas it strains the imagination to envision, say, countries such as Denmark being more than marginally affected by this, countries in the borderland between North and South (such as the entire Mediterranean region) might well be more seriously affected. Migration may also flow in the East-West direction, not so much as a reflection of a population surplus, as because of a deficit of resources, say if the economic transformation embarked upon since 1989 should fail completely. One might, e.g. envisage migration from the former USSR to Poland, and/or from the latter or the Czech republic to Germany^{lviii}.

Another societal security problem is represented by the forces of nationalism that were unleashed by the democratic revolutions of 1989 and 1991 in the former East and South-East of Europe^{lix}. To the extent that this leads to violent strife between ethnic and/or religious or cultural groups (a phenomenon of which there have already been dozens of examples) it certainly constitutes a serious societal security problem. It also threatens to become a political security problem affecting the already weak states in the countries in question, if and when if nationalism is manifested in a struggle for secession. This is often exacerbated by the so-called ‘matrozka effect’, which promises fragmentation down to very small, and often not survivable, political units^{lx}.

Finally, problems such as the above may also have repercussions for the relations between states, i.e. develop into ‘traditional’ security problems. Communal strife thus has a certain in-built propensity for internationalization, especially in those (numerous) cases where a suppressed, exploited or otherwise disadvantaged ethnic group has a ‘paternal’ state.^{lxi} Also, nationalism implies the risk that the numerous unresolved territorial disputes may be reinvigorated. Were this to happen, especially during a period of political weakness, ‘old-fashioned’ war for territorial conquest may, once again, become conceivable.

D. THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

That the environment is degrading was discovered several years ago. However, the awareness of ecological challenges was especially boosted by the publication in 1987 of the report of the Brundtland Commission on *Our Common Future*, which inspired a flood of books on ‘environmental’ or ‘ecologic security’^{lxii}. However, to recognize environmental decay as a problem was, of course, one thing, to elevate it to the status of a *security* problem something else which remains disputed. There are, at least, three different senses in which the environment might become subsumed under an expanded notions of security:

- First of all, environmental problems could be caused by war, or preparations for war, of such severity as to count among the most serious indirect war effects. A precursor of the current environmental awareness in ‘peace circles’ was, for instance, the debate in the early 1980s on the ‘nuclear winter’ hypothesis, according to which even a ‘small-scale’ nuclear war could have caused a climatic and ecological disaster, the casualties of which would not ‘only’ be the warring states, but the entire globe^{lxiii}. The more recent discoveries are, however, in a sense more profound since they imply environmental catastrophe as a result of ‘business as usual’, constituting what will automatically happen ‘unless people stop to think’ (to quote L.F. Richardson).
- Secondly, wars might accrue from environmental problems, e.g. in the form of resource wars. An obvious example might be wars over scarce water supplies, say between states sharing the same river, as has been very close to happening in the Middle East^{lxiv}.
- Thirdly, environmental problems might, according to some analysts, constitute a security threat directly, i.e. whether or not weapons and physical force ever enter into the picture^{lxv}. In extreme cases, the physical basis of a state could be placed in jeopardy by nature. For instance, countries such as Bangladesh or the Netherlands would almost disappear in the case of severe global flooding. In most cases, however, the concept of environmental security presupposes taking individuals (or Mankind) or collectivities rather than states as the referent objects of security. In this case it certainly makes sense to acknowledge that the survival and well-being of people is threatened by environmental problems, which may be conceived of as a form of ‘structural violence’, resulting e.g. in shorter life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates and a deteriorating general health situation.

V. ‘SECURITY’ IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH^{lxvi}

The entire security discourse has, like the IR discipline as a whole, all along been ethnocentric to the extreme.^{lxvii} This is particularly obvious when it comes to the connection between security

and development: a topic which has usually been approached from the angle of the North (and especially the West) in the following manner:

Either economic and social underdevelopment in the South will breed political instability, hence may cause wars which may 'spill over' to the North^{lxviii}. Or they may lead to a militarization implying that countries of the South may come to constitute military threats to the North (*vide* the debate on ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation^{lxix}). In the present author's assessment, these alleged threats should be taken *cum grano salis*: ballistic missiles are no more (probably less) threatening than aircraft and only constitute threats when paired with nuclear weapons; the North constitutes a far more serious threat to the South than vice versa; and only few regions in the North are within reach of ballistic missiles (or aircraft for that matter) from the south—the Mediterranean region constituting one such potentially vulnerable spot.

More importantly, however, it tends to be forgotten that countries of the South are referent objects of security in their own right, i.e. experience security problems. Just as is the case in the North, some of these are endogenous to each country, whereas others are a function of regional conflicts between southern countries. Occasionally, however, the North is perceived as a threat to the security of the South, e.g. manifested in the threat of intervention as well as the (not yet quite abandoned) practice of 'gunboat diplomacy' and various forms of 'covert operations'. Furthermore, most countries of the South are very vulnerable to economic means of 'compellence', such as economic sanctions, an economic security problem that has been further aggravated by the debt crisis.^{lxx}

The security problems of the South differ considerably from those of the North in several respects:

- Intra-state strife tends to loom larger than inter-state threats.
- Political security is generally low because of 'weak states': with fragile support in the population, questionable legitimacy, little or no democratic traditions. Such weak states may even collapse completely, i.e. be reduced to 'virtual' or 'failed' states.
- Regime security is often sought by means of large military expenditures, mostly for internal purposes.
- The level of militarization tends to place great strains on the civilian sector of the economy, hence to jeopardize development.
- Economic underdevelopment causes or exacerbates communal conflicts.

VI. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY: SYNERGIES AND VICIOUS CIRCLES

The above account of Third World security problems illustrates the way in which the various security problems tend to exacerbate each other, locking the country in question into vicious circles—a phenomenon which is also prevalent in the North, especially in the former East:

- An emphasis on military security places great strains on the economy, hence tends to undermine economic security.
- Economic problems tend to cause political instability as well as to contribute to a neglect of urgent environmental protection measures.
- Political instability tends to spur a search for ‘scape-goats’, more often than not in the form of external foes, hence may lead to further militarization.

There is therefore a need for a comprehensive concept of security as a guideline in the urgent quest for a multi-pronged security strategy, lest endeavours along one dimension tend to block the quest for security along others.

On the other hand, one should also guard against excessive ‘securitization’, as this may entail risks:

- A danger of militarization, as the armed forces tend to assume that ‘security is their business’. In times of impending cut-backs in military expenditures, the military tend to be quite eager to embrace expanded notions of security in the hope that this will protect them against further reductions.
- A danger that a desecuritization of issues may lead to a neglect of them. If security concerns, for instance, are accepted as the primary rationale for development assistance, development aid may decline once it is realized that countries of the South constitute no danger to the North.

The above account of new thinking on security has, hopefully, demonstrated that new ideas do exist. However, the history of mankind shows that it may take years, decades, centuries, or even millennia, for such new ideas to become generally accepted and adopted as guidelines for action^{lxxi}. In this section, I shall therefore briefly survey the political field in various countries for signs that the above ideas have actually achieved this status, or are approaching it.

VII. ENDNOTES

^{i.} In Carroll, Lewis: *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 274.

^{ii.} The closest he came to a definition was: ‘National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions’, in Morgenthau, Hans J.: *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 562. In another connection, he added ‘culture’ to the list, emphasizing that the ‘survival of a political unit in its identity’ (i.e. ‘security’) constitutes ‘the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-à-vis other units’. See ‘The Problem of the National Interest’ (1952), in idem: *Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 204-237 (quote from p. 219).

iii. Wolfers, Arnold: 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', in idem: *Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 147-165 (quote from p. 150).

iv. Galtung, Johan: 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', in idem: *Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research. Volume I* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975), pp. 109-134; idem: 'Peace Research', *ibid.*, pp. 150-166; idem: 'What is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s', in idem: *Transarmament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI* (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988), pp. 61-71; cf. Wiberg, Håkan: *Konfliktteori och fredsforskning*, (Stockholm 1976: Esselte Studium), pp. 4-8. On 'stable peace', see Boulding, Kenneth: *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); or idem 'Moving from Unstable to Stable Peace', in Anatoly Gromyko & Martin Hellman (eds.): *Breakthrough. Emerging New Thinking* (New York: Walker & Co., 1988), pp. 157-167. See also Krell, Gert: 'The Development of the Concept of Security', in Egbert Jahn & Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.): *Elements of World Instability: Armaments, Communication, Food, International Division of Labour*, Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Eighth General Conference (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1981), pp. 238-254; Frei, Daniel: 'Was ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu verstehen?', in Wolfgang Heisenberg & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers. Frieden und Sicherheit. Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in Osteuropa* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 41-49; Stephenson, Carolyn: 'New Conceptions of Security and Their Implications for Means and Methods', in Katharine and Majid Tehranian (eds.): *Restructuring for World Peace. On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century* (Creskil, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992), pp. 47-61.

v. A precursor of the present debate was Ullman, Richard: 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-177. Good overviews are Nye, Joseph E. & Sean M. Lynn-Jones: 'International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field', *International Security*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; Lynn-Jones, Sean: 'The Future of International Security Studies', in Desmond Ball & David Horner (eds.): *Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives*, Series 'Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence', vol. 89, (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, 1992), pp. 71-107. See also Mangold, Peter: *National Security and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1990); Booth, Ken: 'Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice', *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), pp. 527-545; idem (ed.): *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991); Klare, Michael & Daniel C. Thomas (eds.): *World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Clarke, Michael (ed.): *New Perspectives on Security* (London: Brassey's, UK and Centre for Defence Studies, 1993); Rees, G. Wyn (ed.): *International Politics in Europe. The New Agenda* (London: Routledge, 1993); Fischer, Dietrich: *Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR, 1993).

vi. Buzan, Barry: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf and Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); idem, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole Wæver & al.: *The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990); Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre: *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993).

vii. Good examples of 'expanded strategic studies' are Brown, Neville: *The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Souchon, Lennart: *Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik* (Herford: Mittler Verlag, 1990).

viii. Wæver, Ole: 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.): *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86; Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde: *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Recent works of a related constructivist or post-structuralist orientation include Campbell, David: *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Revised Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Dalby, Simon: 'Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Policy and Theory', *International Studies* (Burnaby, BC: Dep. of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 1991); Fierke, K.M.: *Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Huysmans, Jef: 'Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 226-255; Hansen, Lene: 'A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 4 (December 1997), pp. 369-397. A basic work on social constructivism is Berger, Peter L. & Thomas Luckman (1967): *The Social Construction of Reality*

(London: Allan Lane). For an application of this approach to the security debate, leading to a critique of the 'Copenhagen School' (Buzan, Wæver and others) for not being constructivist enough is McSweeney, Bill: 'Security and Identity: Buzan and the Copenhagen School', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1996), pp. 81-93; idem: *Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the various 'postmodern' approaches to IR theory see George, Jim: *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Vasquez, John A.: 'The Post-positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall', in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.): *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 217-240. For a critique see Østerrud, Øyvind: 'Antinomies of Postmodernism in International Studies', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 4 (November 1996), pp. 385-390.

^{ix.} For a historical account of 'Realism', see e.g. Smith, Michael Joseph: *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). The best example of classical Realism is Morgenthau: *op. cit.* (note 2). Good examples of neorealism are Waltz, Kenneth N.: *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Gilpin, Robert G.: *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); and Buzan: *op. cit.* (note 6). See also Frankel, Benjamin (ed.): *Roots of Realism* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); idem (ed.): *Realism: Restatements and Renewal* (London: Frank Cass, 1996); Guzzini, Stefano: *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold* (London: Routledge, 1998). For a critique see Vasquez, John: *The Power of Power Politics. From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

^{x.} On the concept of 'nation' see, for instance, two excellent readers: Huthinson, John & Anthony D. Smith (eds.): *Ethnicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and idem & idem (eds.): *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also Gellner, Ernst: *Nations and Nationalism* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Griffiths, Stephen Iwan: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Periwal, Sukumar (ed.): *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995); Anderson, Benedict: *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Brass, Paul: *Nations and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison* (London: Sage, 1991); Kellas, James G.: *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1991); Kupchan, Charles (ed.): *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. A Council of Foreign Relations Book* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Brass, Paul R.: *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison* (London: Sage, 1991); Kellas, James G.: *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).

^{xi.} Spruyt, Hendrik: *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also Fowler, Michael Ross & Julie Marie Bunck: *Law, Power, and the Sovereign State. The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Krasner, Stephen D.: *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

^{xii.} For a critique see Wendt, Alexander: 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

^{xiii.} Sheehan, Michael: *The Balance of Power. History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996). For a critique see Vasquez: *op. cit.* (note 9).

^{xiv.} Neild, Robert: *An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 106-110; Møller, Bjørn: 'Non-Offensive Defence, the Armaments Dynamics, Arms Control and Disarmament', in Burkhard Auffermann (ed.): 'NOD or Disarmament in the Changing Europe?', *Research Reports*, no. 40 (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1990), pp. 43-102; idem: 'From Arms to Disarmament Races: Disarmament Dynamics after the Cold War', in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.): *The New Agenda for Peace Research* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 83-104.

^{xv.} On the pros and cons of nuclear weapons and their proliferation see Sagan, Scott D. & Kenneth N. Waltz: *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Jervis, Robert: *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Glaser, Charles L.: 'The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 112-128; Cimbala, Stephen J.: *The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence* (Westport: Praeger Press, 1998); Gray, Colin: *The Second Nuclear Age* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). On US nuclear policy for the future see Nolan, Janne E.: *An Elusive Consensus. Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War* (Washington,

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^{xvi.} Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 138.

^{xvii.} *ibid.*, pp. 5, 7 and 9.

^{xviii.} Herz, John M.: *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; cf. idem: 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 6), pp. 294-327; Glaser, Charles L.: 'The Security Dilemma Revisited', *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Schweller, Randall L.: 'Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?', in Frankel (ed.): *Realism (op. cit., note 9)*, pp. 90-121. The most elaborate study of the security dilemma is Collins, Alan: *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (Edinburg: Keele University Press and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

^{xix.} Among the theoretical analyses, the following deserve mentioning: Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): *Policies for Common Security* (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985); Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986); Smoke, Richard: 'A Theory of Mutual Security', in idem & Andrei Kortunov (eds.): *Mutual Security. A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 59-111; Gottfried, Kurt et al.: *Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1989); Gottfried, Kurt & Paul Bracken (eds.): *Reforging European Security. From Confrontation to Cooperation* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Nolan, Janne (ed.): *Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

^{xx.} For an overview, see e.g. Milner, Helen: 'Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496. Good examples of this tradition include Jervis, Robert: *loc.cit.* 1978 (note 18); idem: 'Security Regimes', *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley & Alexander Dallin (eds.): *U.S.—Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Axelrod, Robert: *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kanet, Roger E. & Edward A. Kolodziej (eds.): *The Cold War as Competition. Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991); Stein, Arthur A.: *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye: *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Glaser, Charles L.: 'Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help', in Frankel (ed.): *Realism (op. cit., note 9)*, pp. 122-163; Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.): *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1982); Müller, Harald: *Die Chance der Kooperation. Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993); Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer & Volker Rittberger: *Theories of International Regimes*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, vol. 55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

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^{xxi.} Wight, Martin: *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977); Bull, Hedley: *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977); Watson, Adam: *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992). See also Griffiths, Martin: *Realism, Idealism and International Politics. A Reinterpretation* (London: Routledge, 1992); Dunne, Tim: *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* (Houndmills: Macmillans, 1998).

^{xxii.} Møller, Bjørn: *Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and London: UCL Press, 1992). See also idem: *Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence* (London: Brassey's, 1991); and idem: *The Dictionary of Alternative Defence* (forthcoming, 1994); or Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988).

^{xxiii.} Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd. 2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag 1987); Lutz, Dieter S. & Elmar Schmähling (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Diskussion. Bd. 5: Beiträge und Dokumente aus Ost und West* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990). See also the precursor of CS: Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie: *Frieden mit anderen Waffen. Fünf Vorschläge zu einer alternativen Sicherheitspolitik* (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 1981)

^{xxiv.} Cf. Carr, Edward Hallett: *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, second edition 1946 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). For a modern critique, see Joffe, Josef: 'Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends', *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50.

^{xxv.} Lutz, Dieter S.: 'Auf dem Weg zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und für Europa', in idem (ed.): *Kollektive Sicherheit in und für Europa: Eine Alternative? Beiträge zur Utopie und Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitsprogrammatis. Pro und Contra* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1985), pp. 22-44; idem: *Sicherheit 2000. Gemeinsame Sicherheit im Übergang vom Abschreckungsregime zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und für Europa* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991); Senghaas, Dieter: *Europa 2000. Ein Friedensplan* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990); Chalmers, Malcolm: 'Beyond the Alliance System', *World Policy Journal*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215-250; Brauch, Hans Günter: 'From Collective Self-Defence to a Collective Security System in Europe', *Disarmament*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1991), pp. 1-20; Johansen, Robert C.: 'Lessons for Collective Security', *World Policy Journal*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 561-574; Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; idem & idem: 'The Promise of Collective Security', *ibid.*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Butfoy, Andrew: 'Themes Within the Collective Security Idea', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Cusack, Thomas R. & Richard J. Stoll: 'Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; Downs, George W. (ed.): *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Møller, Bjørn: 'Multinationality, Defensivity and Collective Security', in Jörg Calließ (ed.): *Rüstung—Wieviel? Wozu? Wohin?*, *Loccumer Protokolle*, no. 63/93 (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1994), pp. 251-290; idem: 'UN Military Demands and Non-Offensive Defence. Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations', *Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (December 1996), pp. 1-20. For a more sceptical view, see Betts, Richard K.: 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Clark, Mark T.: 'The Trouble with Collective Security', *Orbis*, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258.

^{xxvi.} Recent works about the possible modification, or even abandonment of the 'Westphalian order' of sovereign states include Camilleri, J.A. & Jim Falk: *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (London: Edward Elgar, 1992); Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild & I. William Zartman: *Sovereignty as Responsibility. Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996); Fowler & Bunck: *op. cit.* (note 11); Lugo, Luis E. (ed.): *Sovereignty at the Crossroads. Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Lyons, Gene M. & Michael

Mastanduno (eds.): *Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Sellers, Mortimer (ed.): *The New World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-Determination of Peoples* (Oxford: Berg, 1996).

^{xxvii.} The central document is the report of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (17 June 1992): 'An Agenda for Peace', e.g. in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993. World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 66-80. See also idem: 'An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later', *Orbis*, vol. 37, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 323-332. Examples of the academic debate on humanitarian intervention include the following works: Rodley, Nigel (ed.): *To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights* (London: Brassey's, 1992); Connaughton, Richard: *Military Intervention in the 1990s. A New Logic of War* (London: Routledge, 1992); Levite, Ariel E., Bruce W. Jentleson & Larry Berman (eds.): *Foreign Military Intervention. The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Schraeder, Peter J. (ed.): *Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World*. 2nd Edition (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publ., 1992); Stedman, Stephen John: 'The New Interventionists', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1 (1993), pp. 1-16; Tetzlaff, Rainer: 'Erste und Dritte Welt - zur Legitimität "Politischer Interventionen"', *S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden*, vol. 10, no. 1 (1992), pp. 21-25; Mazarr, Michael J.: 'The Military Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 24, no. 2 (June 1993), pp. 151-162; Roberts, Adam: 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; idem: 'The United Nations and International Security', *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 3-30; Urquhart, Brian: 'The UN: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 265, Winter 1991/92 ('New Dimensions in International Security', Part I), pp. 18-29; Moore, Jonathan (ed.): *Hard Choices. Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Williams, John: 'The Ethical Basis of Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council and Yugoslavia', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 1-23.

^{xxviii.} On the notion of *raison d'état*, see e.g. Meinecke, Friedrich: *Machiavellism. The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984). Besides Machiavelli, other ancestors of modern Realism come close to a personification of the State, e.g. Hobbes, Thomas: *Leviathan*, Edited With an Introduction By C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), who e.g. describes the Common-Wealth (i.e. the 'Leviathan') as 'the multitude so united in one person' (p. 227).

^{xxix.} Walker, R.B.J.: *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Hall, Rodney Bruce: 'Territorial and National Sovereigns: Sovereign Identity and Consequences for Security Policy', *Security Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/Spring 1999), pp. 145-197.

^{xxx.} For an analysis of the communitarian-v-cosmopolitan dichotomy, see Brown, Chris: *International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).

^{xxxi.} Mill, John Stuart: 'Utilitarianism', in Max Lerner (ed.): *Essential Works of John Stuart Mill* (New York: Bantam Books, 1963), pp. 189-248. See also Ellis, Anthony: 'Utilitarianism and International Ethics', in Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel (eds.): *Traditions in International Ethics* (Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 158-179.

^{xxxii.} Cf. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: *Du contrat social* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966).

^{xxxiii.} For a critique of 'reductionism', see e.g. Kenneth Waltz's classic: *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

^{xxxiv.} Quotation from Hobbes: *op. cit.* (note 28), p. 186.

^{xxxv.} E.g. Buzan: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 6), pp. 35-56.

^{xxxvi.} Ayoob, Mohammed: *The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); idem: 'The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective', in Brian J. Job (ed.): *The Insecurity Dilemma. National Security of Third World States* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 63-80 (quotation from p. 66); Job, Brian L.: 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World', *ibid.*, pp. 11-35; Weiss, Thomas G. & Maryl A. Kessler (eds.): *Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era. A World Peace Foundation Study* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Holsti, Kalevi J.: *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

^{xxxvii.} See e.g. Holsti, Kalevi J.: 'International Theory and War in the Third World', in Job (ed.):

op.cit. (note 36), pp. 37-60; cf. for a historical perspective: idem: *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); or Van Creveld, Martin: *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Snow, Donald M.: *UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Zartmann, William I. (ed.): *Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Cilliers, Jakkie & Peggy Mason (eds.): *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies* (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); Reno, William: *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

^{xxxviii.} The classical formulation of the thesis (not referring explicitly to democracies, but to representative government in general) is Kant, Immanuel (1795): *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1963). A general survey of the idea is provided by Gleditsch, Nils Petter: 'Democracy and Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 369-376. The recent revival of interest in the thesis may be traced back to Doyle, Michael: 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3-4 (1983), pp. 205-35, 323-353. Recent works include Russett, Bruce: *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Elman, Miriam Fendius: *Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); MacMillan, John: *On Liberal Peace. Democracy, War and the International Order* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Gowa, Joanne: *Ballots and Bullets. The Elusive Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor: *Elections and War. The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Ray, James Lee: *Democracy and International Conflict. An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Weart, Spencer R.: *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

^{xxxix.} Fukuyama, Francis: *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992); idem: 'Democratization and International Security', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 266, Winter 1991/92 ('New Dimensions in International Security. Part II'), pp. 14-24.

^{xi.} See e.g. Bächler, Günther: 'Gewaltverzicht durch Demokratisierung. Dimensionen der Demokratisierung der friedens- und sicherheitspolitischen Diskussion', in Wolfgang R. Vogt (ed.): *Mut zum Frieden. Über die Möglichkeiten einer Friedensentwicklung für das Jahr 2000* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990), pp. 176-187; Johansen, Robert C.: 'Real Security is Democratic Security', *Alternatives*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 209-242; Rourke, John T., Richard P. Hiskes & Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh: *Direct Democracy and International Politics. Deciding International Issues Through Referendums* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

^{xii.} On the promotion of democracy and human rights see Peceny, Mark: *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

^{xiii.} Bienen, Henry (ed.): *Power, Economics, and Security. The United States and Japan in Focus* (Boulder: Westview, 1992); cf. Buzan: *op.cit.* 1991 (note 6), pp. 230-269.

^{xiii.} See e.g. Knorr, Klaus: 'The Determinants of Military Power', in Bienen (ed.): *op.cit.* (note 42), pp. 69-133; which is an update on idem: *The War Potential of Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

^{xiv.} Becker, Abraham S.: 'U.S.-Soviet Trade and East-West Trade Policy', in Arnold L. Horelick (ed.): *U.S.-Soviet Relations. The Next Phase* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 175-197; Stent, Angela: 'Economic Containment', in Terry L. Deibel & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): *Containing the Soviet Union. A Critique of US Policy* (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), pp. 59-77. On the debate on most-favoured-nation status for the USSR in return for 'good behaviour' in the realm of arms control, see e.g. Garthoff, Raymond: *Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 87-93.

^{xv.} See e.g. Goodwin, Crauford D.: 'National Security in Classical Political Economy', in idem (ed.): *Economics and National Security. A History of Their Interaction. Annual Supplement to Volume 23, History of Political Economy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 23-35.

^{xvi.} On the follow-on system, see Kaldor, Mary: *The Baroque Arsenal* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981).

^{xvii.} See e.g. Cohen, Richard & Peter A. Wilson: *Superpowers in Economic Decline. U.S. Strategy for the Transcentury Era* (New York: Crane Russak, 1990); cf. Deger, Saadet & Somnath Sen: *Military Expenditure. The Political Economy or International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University

Press/SIPRI: Strategic Issue Papers, 1990); Mintz, Alex (ed.): *The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States* (London: Routledge, 1992); Väyrynen, Raimo: *Military Industrialization and Economic Development. Theory and Historical Case Studies* (Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR, 1992). The only IP theoretician who has dealt at length with this matter is Gilpin, Robert G.: *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); idem: 'The Economic Dimension of International Security', in Bienen (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 42), pp. 51-68. His hypotheses received historical support from Paul Kennedy's monumental *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hymann, 1988).

^{xviii.} On the effectiveness of economic blockade, see e.g. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott: *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy*, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990). For an analysis of Sweden's quest for this form of economic security, see Agrell, Wilhelm: *Sveriges civila säkerhet* (Stockholm: Liber Förlag, 1984). For a similar analysis of Switzerland, see e.g. Fischer, Dietrich: 'Invulnerability Without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1982, pp. 205-225.

^{xix.} Galtung, Johan: *There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), p. 13; Fischer, Dietrich: *Preventing War in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), pp. 142-153; idem, Wilhelm Nolte & Jan Øberg: *Frieden gewinnen. Mit autonomen Initiativen den Teufelskreis durchbrechen* (Freiburg: Dreisam Verlag, 1987), pp. 195-199; Øberg, Jan: *Myter om vor sikkerhed. En kritik af dansk forsvarspolitik i et udviklingsperspektiv* (Copenhagen: Mellempøkeligt Samvirke, 1980); idem: *At udvikle sikkerhed og sikre udvikling* (Copenhagen: Vindrose, 1983), pp. 131-142.

^{i.} Emmanuel, Arghiri: *L'Échange Inégal* (Paris: Maspero, 1969); Frank, Andre Gunter: *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Galtung, Johan: 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1971), pp. 81-118; Amin, Samir: *Le développement inégal* (Paris: Editions du Minuit, 1973); idem: *L'accumulation a l'échelle mondiale*, vols. 1-2 (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1976).

^{ii.} Haas, Ernst: *International Political Communities*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 93-110; cf. idem: 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing' (1970), in Richard A. Falk & Saul Mendlowitz (eds.): *Regional Politics and World Order* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 103-130; Hansen, Roger: 'Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts', in Michael Hodges (ed.): *European Integration*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 184-199. See also the prize-winning essay by Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe: 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1991, pp. 1-22.

^{iii.} On complex interdependence, see Keohane & Nye: *op.cit.* (note 20); cf. for a historical survey: Wilde, Jaap de: *Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991); Tromp, Hylke: 'Interdependence and Security: the Dilemma of the Peace Research Agenda', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 19, no. 2 (1988), pp. 151-158; Haas, Ernst B.: 'War, Interdependence and Functionalism', in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.): *The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States* (London: Sage, 1987), pp. 108-127.

^{iiii.} Bolz, Klaus: 'Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Ost-West Wirtschaftsbeziehungen', in Bahr & Lutz (eds.): *op. cit.* 1987 (note 23), pp. 129-142; Wilke, Peter: 'Ökonomische Aspekte Gemeinsamer Sicherheit. Anmerkungen zum Stand der Debatte', *ibid.*, pp. 151-168.

^{iv.} A proponents of this view is Booth, Ken (1991): 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4 (1991), pp. 313-327; idem: 'Human Wrongs and International Relations', *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 103-126. See also Suhrke, Astri: 'Human Security and the Interests of States', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 265-276; Zacarias, Agostinho: *Security and the State in Southern Africa* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). For a related view see Falk, Richard: *Predatory Globalization. A Critique* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999).

^{lv.} Wæver, Ole: 'Societal Security: the Concept', in idem et al.: *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 17-40 (quote from p. 23). See also Buzan, Barry: 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalization', *ibid.*, pp. 41-58.

^{lvi.} E.g. Lellouche, Pierre: *Le nouveau monde. De l'ordre de Yalta au désordre des nations* (Paris: Grasset, 1992), pp. 257-305.

^{lvii.} See e.g. Weiner, Myron: 'Security, Stability and International Migration', *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 91-126.

^{lviii.} Heisler, Martin O. & Zig Layton-Henry: 'Migration and the Links Between Social and Societal Security', in Wæver et al.: *op. cit.* (note 6), pp. 148-166.

^{lix.} See e.g. Snyder, Jack: 'Averting Anarchy in the New Europe', *International Security*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; Griffiths, Stephen Iwan: *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security* (SIPRI Research Report No. 5) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

^{lx.} The image refers to the famous Russian wooden dolls: When you open the biggest one, a smaller appears, inside which is an even smaller, etc. On secession see Mortimer: *op. cit.* (note 26); Cassese, Antonio: *Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Freeman, Michael: 'The Right to Self-Determination in International Politics: Six Theories in Search of a Policy', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1999), pp. 355-370; Meadwell, Hudson: 'Secession, States and International Society', *ibid.*, pp. 371-387. On Russia see Baev, Pavel: 'Russia's Stance against Secessions: From Chechnya to Kosovo', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 73-94.

^{lxi.} Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (London: Routledge, 1992); and Muni, S.D. (ed.): *Pangs of Proximity. India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis* (New Delhi and London: Sage, and Oslo: PRIO, 1993); Brown, Michael E. (ed.): *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild (eds.): *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

^{lxii.} Brundtland Commission (World Commission on Environment and Development): *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Brundtland, Gro Harlem: 'The Environment, Security and Development', *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 15-26; Moss, Richard H.: 'Resource Scarcity and Environmental Security', *ibid.*, pp. 27-36. See also Prins, Gwyn: 'Politics and the Environment', *International Affairs*, vol. 66, no. 4 (1990), pp. 711-730; Renner, Michael G.: 'National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions', *Worldwatch Paper*, no. 89 (Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1989); Thomas, Caroline: *The Environment in International Relations* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 115-151 *et passim*; Weizsäcker, Ernst U. von: *Erdpolitik. Ökologische Realpolitik an der Schwelle zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt*, third, updated edition (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992); Boulding, Elise: 'States, Boundaries and Environmental Security', in Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.): *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 194-208; Dalby, Simon: 'Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse', *Alternatives*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 95-134; Suliman, Mohamed (ed.): *Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 1998). See also the discussion on environmental security in Elise Boulding (ed.): *New Agendas for Peace Research. Conflict and Security Reexamined* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Brock, Lothar: 'Security Through Defending the Environment: An Illusion?', pp. 79-102; Mische, Patricia: 'Security Through Defending the Environment: Citizens Say Yes!', pp. 103-120; and Oswald, Ursula: 'Ecodevelopment: What Security for the Third World', pp. 121-126. A good overview of Græger, Nina: 'Review Essay: Environmental Security', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 109-116.

^{lxiii.} See e.g. Sagan, Carl: 'Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe' (*Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983-84), in William P. Bundy (ed.): *The Nuclear Controversy. A Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York: New American Library, 1985), pp. 117-152; Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy & Walter Orr Roberts: *The Cold and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984); Gleditsch, Nils Petter: 'Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no. 3 (May 1998), pp. 381-400.

^{lxiv.} Gleick, Peter H.: 'Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security', *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Lowi, Miriam R.: 'Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of Westbank Water', *ibid.*, pp. 113-138; Beschomer, Natasha: 'Water and Instability in the Middle East', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 273 (London: IISS, 1992); Morris, Mary E.: 'Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle East', *The Emirates Occasional Papers*, no. 14 (1998); Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.: *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Hauge, Wenche & Tanja Ellingsen: 'Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no. 3 (May 1998), pp. 299-317; Elhance, Arun P.: *Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).

^{lxv.} See e.g. the discussion in Ball, Desmond & David Horner (eds.): *Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives*, Series 'Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence', vol. 89 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific

Studies, the Australian National University, 1992), especially Sean Lynn-Jones: *loc. cit.* (note 5) who argues for a broader, yet still national security-oriented, agenda with a focus on military matters; and Gwyn Prins: 'A New Focus for Security Studies' (pp. 178-222) who is in favour of a complete shift of focus to the environment. An even more extreme, 'eco-centric', view is that of Eckersley, Robyn: *Environmentalism and Political Theory* (London: UCL Press, 1992).

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^{lxvii.} Neuman, Stephanie (ed.): *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

^{lxviii.} See e.g. Nincic, Miroslav: *How War Might Spread to Europe* (London: SIPRI/Taylor & Francis, 1985).

^{lxix.} Bailey, Kathleen: *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1992). On ballistic missile proliferation, see e.g. Carus, W. Seth: 'Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Threat and Response', *The Washington Papers*, no. 146 (New York: Praeger & The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990); Karp, Aaron: 'Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1989. World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1989), pp. 287-318; idem: 'Controlling Ballistic Missile Proliferation', *Survival*, vol. 33, no. 6 (1991), pp. 517-530; Nolan, Janne E.: *Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991); Fetter, Steve: 'Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?', *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; Navias, Martin: *Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East* (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993); Neuneck, Götz & Otfried Ischebeck (eds.): *Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992). On nuclear proliferation, see e.g. Spector, Leonard S.: *Nuclear Proliferation Today* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); Meyer, Stephen M.: *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984); Fischer, David: *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past and the Prospects* (London: Routledge, 1992); Barnaby, Frank: *How Nuclear Weapons Spread. Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s* (London: Routledge, 1993). On chemical weapons and missiles, see Findlay, Trevor (ed.): *Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). On the proliferation problems stemming from the dissolution of the USSR, see Zagorski, Alexander: 'Post-Soviet Nuclear Proliferation Risks', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 27-39.

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^{lxxi.} On this phenomenon, exemplified by the idea of 'peace', see Rapoport, Anatol: *Peace. An Idea Whose Time Has Come* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

Expansion. The Federal Reserve designs its monetary policy to manage the business cycle. The period following a trough is the expansionary phase, which the Fed brings on by lowering interest rates and adding money to the financial system. To add money, the Fed buys Treasury bonds in the open market. This replaces bonds held in portfolios with cash the investors put in banks. The banks, in turn, are eager to lend out this extra money. Companies take advantage of the availability of loans and low interest rates to purchase factories and equipment and hire employees so they can produce more produ