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Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security

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Introduction

The *Declaration on Security in the Americas*, adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in October 2003, created a new concept of hemispheric security that broadens the traditional definition of national defense to incorporate new threats, including political, economic, social, health, and environmental concerns, to such an extent that almost any problem can now be considered a security threat.

The implementation of this new concept may lead to greater “securitization” of the region’s problems, defined as the treatment of these problems as if they were security threats. Securitization carries with it the risk of military responses to problems that are not military in nature and in circumstances where military action is ill-suited or could cause more harm than good, a tendency that is already well under way in Latin America. This risk exists due to four main factors:

- 1) The historic tendency of the region’s armed forces to intervene politically under authoritarian regimes or during periods of armed conflict or social instability;
- 2) The U.S. “war on drugs,” which encourages a greater role for the region’s militaries in domestic law enforcement;
- 3) The inability of most of the region’s police forces to respond effectively to growing crime and violence;



The convergence of the new OAS and U.S. visions of security in Latin America will likely obstruct the long and difficult path towards consolidating democracy and strengthening civilian institutions in the region.

4) The U.S. “war on terror,” particularly its expansive and nebulous definition of terrorism, which in turn encourages the armed forces to combat terrorism in whatever form it is expressed.

The OAS’s new concept of hemispheric security will only enhance Latin America’s historic tendency and current trajectory towards giving its militaries greater internal and non-traditional responsibilities. By encompassing such a broad range of security threats, the OAS *Declaration on Security in the Americas* justifies, like never before, the use of Latin American armed forces in new and non-traditional missions. U.S. foreign policy, which now views a similarly broad range of regional problems through the lens of terrorism, further enhances that possibility. The convergence of the new OAS and U.S. visions of security in Latin America will likely obstruct the long and difficult path towards consolidating democracy and strengthening civilian institutions in the region. Furthermore, these visions of regional security offer ineffective and inappropriate methods to resolve the wide range of problems of social, economic, political, and environmental origins facing Latin America.

The “Wars” on Drugs and Crime Increase Militarization in Latin America

Latin America has a history of militarization in response to internal conflict, instability and crime. Although the region is no longer governed by military dictatorships and all but one of the region’s countries have democratically elected leaders, many countries in the region have turned to their militaries to respond to internal problems. This is primarily due to two factors: 1) the threat of drug trafficking, and U.S. counter-drug policies that encourage regional militaries to take

on counter-drug responsibilities; and 2) the lack of effective public security policies, rendering law enforcement institutions unable to respond to growing crime and insecurity.

Since the mid 1980s, when the Reagan administration declared illegal drugs a national security threat, a central part of the U.S. “war on drugs” has consisted of enhancing the ability of Latin American armed forces to carry out counternarcotics initiatives.¹ The pressure that the United States exerts within the framework of its counternarcotics policy towards Latin America is one of the main factors that has spurred the region’s armed forces to intervene in internal security matters.²

In addition, rising crime rates throughout the region are generating intense social demands for effective responses that will guarantee citizen security while also resolving social conflict caused by poverty and inequality. The failure of police forces to meet these demands has increasingly led governments to turn to the armed forces in matters of internal policing.

The effects of U.S. counternarcotics policies can be seen clearly in Bolivia, where the U.S. military has been directly involved in counter-drug efforts and has encouraged the Bolivian military to take on a greater counter-drug role. In 1988, the U.S. government funded the creation of a Bolivian air force unit and a naval group to carry out drug interdiction operations. The trend continued with the launching of the Andean Initiative, under which the U.S. government began “a deliberate incorporation of host country military forces into the counternarcotics effort and an expanded role for the U.S. military throughout the region.”³ More recently, U.S. Special Forces trained the Bolivian counternarcotics police force; the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section funded a paramilitary counterdrug unit (the Expeditionary Task Force), which was commanded by Bolivian military officers;

and the Pentagon provided helicopters and other equipment to security forces for drug control activities.

The Bolivian military's internal role is not limited to counternarcotics, but includes broader law enforcement efforts as well. The army is occasionally called on to respond to popular protests. For example, when the La Paz police mutinied in February 2003, President Sanchez de Lozada deployed soldiers to restore public order. Their subsequent clash led to 32 dead and hundreds wounded.⁵ According to scholar Juan Ramón Quintana, "the militarization of public security as well as the militarized response to social conflicts corresponded with a dramatic increase in human rights violations."⁶

In Mexico, the military's involvement in domestic law enforcement has grown considerably in the past decades. Sigrid Arzt explains that "the process of militarization of public security is an ad hoc policy response on the part of the Mexican political elite to the escalation of organized crime, particularly in the phenomenon of drug trafficking."⁷ While the Mexican army has historically been involved in manual eradication of illicit crops, President Miguel de la Madrid's 1987 declaration identifying drug trafficking as a national security threat led to the expansion of the military's counterdrug mission to embrace law enforcement and intelligence tasks as well. U.S. policy has encouraged this trend through the provision of counter-drug training and equipment for the Mexican military, as well as rhetorical support for militarization as a temporary solution to the problems of police and prosecutorial corruption and ineptitude.

Militarization in Mexico occurs in two ways: the expansion of the military's role as an institution to include public security and law enforcement responsibilities, and the appointment of military personal (active, licensed, or retired) to civilian



ANDEAN INFORMATION NETWORK

The Expeditionary Task Force (ETF), comprised of former Bolivian soldiers and operating outside the military chain of command, was funded by the United States to carry out counternarcotics activities in Bolivia. The ETF committed gross violations of human rights.

posts. Since 1995 the Defense Ministry has served as a member of the National Public Security Council, giving it a role in public security decisions and policymaking. The army now has a direct role in efforts to track down and detain drug cartel bosses. Military personnel have also been assigned to police forces and prosecutors' offices in regions with high levels of drug trafficking activity, including the Federal Preventive Police and the federal attorney general's office; for most of the Fox administration, the attorney general was a brigadier general. The Mexican army has also assumed other internal roles such as social work, environmental protection, and natural disaster response. In its most recent white book, the Mexican army identifies extreme poverty and social exclusion as national security threats as well.

In Brazil, a country characterized by poverty and social and racial inequality, crime and homicide rates exceed those of Colombia, a country in the midst of an armed conflict.⁸ The police forces are often part of the problem instead of the solution. In response, governments across the party spectrum have resorted to the armed forces as an immediate "solution."⁹

Since the 1990s the fight against drug trafficking in Brazil has been the principal justification for the intervention of the armed forces in law enforcement tasks. Frequently, the governing elites appeal to the army to militarily "occupy" the *favelas* (shantytowns) of Rio de Janeiro or Sao

The failure of police forces to halt rising crime rates has increasingly led governments to turn to the armed forces in matters of internal policing.

Paulo after attacks break out between drug trafficking groups that are disputing territorial control or confronting police conducting counternarcotics operations.¹⁰ In June 2004, the Brazilian congress approved legislation that permits the armed forces to take on police functions in the war on drugs, and in July of the same year approved a law called the *Lei de Abate* that authorizes the Brazilian air force to bring down any plane they suspect is transporting drugs.¹¹ Brazil's counternarcotics policies have been influenced by the militarized U.S. counter-drug strategy. According to the Transnational Institute, "Brazil has been pulled along, little by little, towards the U.S. inspired "war on drugs."¹²

The Brazilian armed forces are also used for other public security matters, such as when they were called in to act against rebelling or striking police forces in seven Brazilian states in 1997. More recently, immediately after the assassination of U.S. missionary Dorothy Stang, an environmental activist and advocate for rural workers in the state of Pará, the federal government deployed 2000 army troops to reestablish order and detain those responsible for the crime. The commander in charge of the troops claimed, "Our mission is to give assistance, security, and logistical aid to the detachments of police in the operations, but we are prepared for any situation of confrontation."¹³ According to Paulo Mezquita, the federal government has limited participation of the armed forces in the public security area to those situations in which the police are unable to guarantee security. Nevertheless, he concludes that "the federal government still depends on the armed forces to maintain law and order, especially when the police are involved in illegal actions or disorder."¹⁴

In Venezuela, military presence in public life has increased significantly during the last few years as a consequence of a deep crisis in the system of political representation. Current president Hugo Chávez began his political career by

leading a failed coup in February 1992. With Chávez's rise to power, the armed forces have increased their presence in national politics. The 1999 Constitution created a new security and national defense model which includes economic, social, political and environmental factors, areas traditionally not seen as related to security.

Argentina, like many other Latin American countries that have suffered military dictatorships responsible for serious and widespread human rights violations, has a legal framework that prohibits the intervention of the armed forces in internal security issues except for clear exceptions of internal commotion.¹⁵ In spite of this legal impediment, the possible intervention of the armed forces in the public security area is an issue that frequently returns to public debate in different contexts. For example, confronted with a wave of kidnappings in the city and province of Buenos Aires in 2004, then-President Eduardo Duhalde proposed to reconsider the possibility of allowing the armed forces to carry out internal security functions.¹⁶ Even though this proposal was categorically rejected by the national government, it received much support from business and political sectors in Buenos Aires province. These sectors also proposed that the armed forces be used to resolve the intense social conflict resulting from failed neoliberal policies applied in the 1990s.¹⁷

The "War on Terror" Furthers Militarization

Terrorism has become the number one foreign policy priority for the U.S. government, and the "war on terror," launched as a response to the terrorist attacks of 2001, is now the main mission of the U.S. military. This war is not characterized by a clearly defined enemy, however. According to Jeffery Record, "The nature and parameters of [the] war [on terror]...remain frustratingly unclear. The administration has postulated a multiplicity

of enemies, including rogue states; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators; terrorist organizations of global, regional and national scope; and terrorism itself. It also seems to have conflated them into a monolithic threat, and in so doing has subordinated strategic clarity to the moral clarity it strives for in foreign policy....”¹⁸

Within this framework, and in line with the overarching foreign policy and security priorities of the Bush administration, the Pentagon and its Southern Command (Southcom) are viewing Latin America through the lens of terrorism, even though the region is of little strategic importance in the global war on terror. They are superimposing U.S. concerns about terrorism onto a wide range of problems in the region, as if all these problems were potential terrorist threats. In March 2004 for example, then Commander in Chief of Southcom, General James Hill, stated that “terrorists throughout the Southern Command area of responsibility bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, launder money, and smuggle humans.”¹⁹ He also grouped a variety of criminal activities under the broad umbrella of terrorism by saying, “not surprisingly, Islamic radical groups, narcoterrorists in Colombia, and urban gangs across Latin America all practice many of the same illicit business methods.”²⁰ These statements, which exaggerated the terrorist threat in the hemisphere and recommended a larger role for Southcom and regional militaries in responding to law enforcement problems, illustrate how the inappropriate application of a diffuse concept of terrorism leads to a distorted diagnosis of the region’s problems and their potential solutions.

The “war on terror”—which uses a broad and nebulous definition of terrorism and encourages an essentially military response to this phenomenon—has had impacts both direct and diffuse in Latin America. The direct impacts can be seen in the design and in the application of national policies to respond to threats to security.

The clearest example is Colombia. The country is grappling with an intractable forty-year-old internal armed conflict involving several armed groups, but the current government’s policy is to reduce this situation to a problem of terrorism.²¹

Equally troubling is that other conflicts with political or social roots—the kinds most commonly afflicting the countries of the region—may be treated as security threats and, directly or indirectly, as terrorist threats. One example is the case of southern Chile, where indigenous leaders who have disputed land rights with the Chilean government, businessmen, and landowners, have been convicted of terrorism. Even though the Chilean government has not called on the armed forces to respond to this social conflict, it has applied an antiterrorist law inherited from the dictatorship of General Pinochet against members of the Mapuche indigenous community, provoking police brutality and other violations of human rights and due process.²² Even though some members of the Mapuche tribe have committed illegal acts in the context of their claims (in general crimes against private property; they have never taken a human life), it is an implausible stretch for the courts to treat this conflict as if it involved terrorist offenses. Even though it is not possible to draw a direct causal relationship between this tendency and the post-September 11 context, it is clear that the region has been influenced by the new security paradigm and the definition of terrorism promoted by U.S. policy. Human Rights Watch explains that it “fears that the current international climate has provided support for the Lagos government’s inappropriate use of the Chilean anti-terrorism law. The U.S.-led campaign against terrorism has, unfortunately, become a cover for governments who want to deflect attention away from their heavy-handed treatment of internal dissidents. Today, governments in countries around the

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world are attempting to use anti-terrorism or national security measures as a means of avoiding international scrutiny of dubious human rights practices.”²³

Broad definitions blur the lines

In the context of this broad definition of what constitutes a potential terrorist threat, the U.S. military is labeling as terrorist threats long-standing problems that would have previously been determined policing matters or social issues. This is what we refer to as the “securitization” of social problems.

For example, in his testimony before the U.S. Congress in April 2004, Gen. Hill stated that the principal threats confronting the region are terrorism, narco-trafficking, organized crime, gangs, and the activities of “radical populists,” pointing out in particular the movement led by Evo Morales in Bolivia.²⁴ In speaking of mechanisms to confront these new threats, specifically street gangs, Gen. Hill sustained that for many Latin American countries it was difficult and complex to respond to these groups because they fall “precisely on a seam between law enforcement and military operations.”²⁵ Instead of advocating clear lines between police and military roles, he stated that “Latin American leaders need to resolve this jurisdictional responsibility issue to promote cooperation among their police and military forces while simultaneously restructuring their states’ security forces.”²⁶

In his testimony before Congress in March 2005, Gen. Hill’s successor and current Southcom commander, Gen. Bantz Craddock, provided a more nuanced and accurate diagnosis of the roots of instability in the Americas. He described the social, economic and public security problems as the main challenges in the region, and did not equate them with terrorism. Nevertheless, his testimony, just like that of his predecessor, continued to generate doubts about what should be the

appropriate responses to these problems by suggesting that the armed forces could have a role in solving them.²⁷

Other high-level Defense Department officials continue to blur the lines between appropriate police and military roles and to conflate the region’s problems under a broad definition of terrorism. During the Sixth Conference of Defense Ministers in Ecuador in November 2004, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld referred to the threats confronting the region in the following terms: “Terrorists, drug traffickers, hostage takers, and criminal gangs form an anti-social combination that increasingly seeks to destabilize civil societies.”²⁸

Impact on Colombia

During the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of U.S. counter-drug aid to Colombia went to train and equip the police, the main counternarcotics agency.²⁹ This changed in 2000 when the U.S. Congress approved “Plan Colombia,” a \$1.3 billion counter-drug aid package primarily destined for the military. (The total aid under Plan Colombia has since exceeded \$4 billion.) According to Lemus, Stanton and Walsh, up to that point “the Colombian armed forces had avoided any significant role in drug control efforts.... The armed forces viewed illegal drugs as a law enforcement issue, to be dealt with by the police, while their primary adversaries were the guerrillas.”³⁰ Like its Andean neighbors, the Colombian armed forces began to play a leading role in counternarcotics efforts.

Plan Colombia was originally intended as a counter-drug program. However, after the 9/11 attacks, Congress expanded the authority of the State Department and the Pentagon to use the counter-drug aid for counter-terror purposes as well, arguing that there was no way to distinguish between drug traffickers and the terrorist groups in Colombia, all of whom receive financing from the drug trade.

That shift coincided with the 2002 election of President Álvaro Uribe, who campaigned on a platform centered on security. Upon taking office he implemented his Democratic Security Policy, which increased the militarization of public security spheres that had begun with the incorporation of the drug control mission under the armed forces. Surely influenced by the global impact of the U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the Uribe administration began to use the word “terrorism” to refer to the Colombian problem, denying the existence of an armed conflict. These measures aligned the Uribe government with the Bush administration’s war on terror, converting Colombia into the strongest U.S. ally in the region.

The anti-terror rhetoric employed by high-level Colombian officials often reveals a logic of war that is not dissimilar from the Bush administration’s sentiment that “you’re either with us or against us.” There is also strong pressure on the armed forces and police to obtain results in confronting “terrorist” organizations. The combination of these factors has served to stigmatize sectors that are critical of the government, particularly civil society and social movement leaders, by associating them with armed groups.³¹ According to the International Crisis Group, “Uribe’s willingness to provide the army and police with additional powers and fewer constitutional and judicial checks risks an increase in arbitrary actions by the security forces against the civilian population, as has occurred in the Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones (RCZs) and other parts of the country.”³² Another example is the massive detention of persons, most of whom are later released for lack of evidence.³³ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted, in its latest report, an increase in allegations of extrajudicial executions and due process violations.³⁴



VOILA ARCHIVES

The New OAS Security Concept in Context

In October 2003, the OAS adopted a new concept of hemispheric security through the passage of the *Declaration on Security in the Americas*. According to the declaration, “the security threats, concerns, and other challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and nontraditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects.”³⁵ In other words, the new definition broadens the traditional concept of security, incorporating new and non-traditional threats. This declaration considers the following practices as threats, concerns, or other challenges to security:

[T]errorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them; extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect[s] stability and democracy..., erodes social cohesion and undermines the security of states;

Police in Peru provide security for a march against the Andean Free Trade Agreement.

The traditional concept of hemispheric security “must be expanded to encompass new and nontraditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects...”—OAS

natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and environmental degradation; trafficking in persons; attacks to cyber security; the potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and the possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.³⁶

The declaration recognizes the prerogative of sovereign States to identify their own priorities with respect to security and flexibility when choosing mechanisms to confront threats. It incorporates democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law, and multilateralism as shared values of the hemisphere’s states. Finally, the declaration incorporates the concept of human security to reaffirm that the fundamental reason for being of security for democratic States of the hemisphere is the protection of human life.³⁷

This new security system has been called “multidimensional” and possessing a “flexible architecture.” The multidimensionality resides in the broadening of the traditional concept of regional security, linked to defense and the security of States, starting from the incorporation of new threats, concerns, and challenges. The flexibility of the architecture is related to the diversity of mechanisms which the States can use to respond to these threats.

The adoption of a new system of security for the region generated various reactions. Some officials involved in the negotiations emphasized that the Declaration updated the obsolete Cold War-era security scheme and reflected the region’s new security-related needs.³⁸ But others felt that the Declaration’s content, as seen by the

long list of threats, is not an agreement of consensus, but a reflection of the impossibility of creating a common agenda for security in the region.³⁹ Instead of clearly establishing a common agenda to confront the security challenges of the region, the new scheme seems more like a long list of the diverse problems facing each county, sub-region, or region.

The transformation of the security system of the Americas responds to a clear necessity to update a system that prevailed under the logic of the Cold War and that had stopped responding to the reality of the region.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, given the current context of the region and the concept of terrorism promoted by the United States, the implementation of this new multidimensional concept constitutes a risk of increasing the securitization of the region’s problems and, consequently, militarization as a response to confront them.

By our criteria, the OAS’s new concept of multidimensional security of the OAS suffers from two main problems:

First, it views common problems in the region, such as extreme poverty, social exclusion, HIV and other illnesses, and natural disasters, through the lens of national security, conceiving them as threats. In this sense, the declaration creates conditions for the securitization of problems of a political, economic, social, or environmental nature that, in principle, should not be part of an agenda of hemispheric security. As a result, everything is now a security problem.

Second, the declaration dilutes the historic difference between the concepts of defense and public (or citizen) security that has existed in the region until now by failing to distinguish traditional security threats from new threats. The armed forces play a central role in defense of the country, understood as the protection of the integrity of the State—both politically

and geographically—from external threats and, in exceptional circumstances clearly defined by law, of grave instances of internal commotion that threaten the integrity of the State. Public security, as it is traditionally conceived, is related to the maintenance of public order, for which it employs police forces to promote compliance with the law. The concept of citizen security emerged in Latin America as a broader conception of public security emphasizing the protection of the citizen and his or her rights as a central part of police function.

In the context of the Declaration, the securitization of political, social, or economic problems on the one hand, and militarized responses on the other, are two sides of the same coin. A meeting of experts about the multidimensional aspect of security concluded: “The principle risk is that development problems are associated with “threats” to security, with which military strategies can be alternatives.”⁴¹

As we mentioned before, it is important to emphasize that securitization and militarization are not practices that were created by this new concept of multidimensional security. On the contrary, these types of practices, above all the use of armed forces in internal affairs, already existed in various countries before the adoption of the Declaration. Nevertheless, the implementation of the declaration in these circumstances creates certain risks that the current tendencies towards militarization of domestic affairs, particularly public security matters, will increase in the region, because the Declaration’s new definition of security—in which almost everything can be considered a security threat—reinforces and legitimizes these tendencies.

Furthermore, the incorporation of a series of diverse problems—like public security, development, environment, and health—into the concept of security is an obstacle for the Declaration’s

operational implementation, turning a new multidimensional concept of security into an empty concept. For that reason, it seems unlikely to be an effective tool for protecting the States and citizens of the Americas.

The Sixth Conference of Defense Ministers is a good example of how the OAS’s new multidimensional concept conforms to the U.S. security agenda for the region. The conference’s declaration, known as the Quito Declaration, refers to the new concept of multidimensional security, but emphasizes the threat of terrorism above all else. Terrorism occupies a disproportionately large place in the declaration compared to other threats or concerns, in a hemisphere where, aside from Colombia, there is not significant terrorist activity.

Like the *OAS Declaration of Security in the Americas*, the Quito Declaration blurs the dividing line between the duties of the police and those of the armed forces. Declarations from previous defense ministerials have focused primarily on defense, both in terms of issues and mechanisms (such as fostering mutual trust and transparency; defense policy, military cooperation; education of civilians and military personnel, etc.). On the few occasions that both defense and security were mentioned together, it was understood that they referred to a concept of regional or hemispheric security.⁴² Nevertheless, in incorporating the multidimensional concept of security, the Quito Declaration treats the concepts of defense and security as almost the same thing and for the moment it is difficult to identify the differences and particularities of each one of them in relation to the functions that the police and military should carry out. For example, the Quito Declaration establishes that “Among the common concerns for security and defense, whether traditional or nontraditional, conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and mutual confidence building

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among the States of the region are included, on the basis of a cooperative concept of security and defense, which recognizes its multidimensional character, involves State and non-State actors, and includes political, economic, social, and natural components.”⁴³

Conclusion

The OAS adoption of the new multidimensional security concept opportunely replaced an old hemispheric security structure that did not respond to the region's needs. Its multidimensional character, and above all, its flexible architecture, could become mechanisms for responding to the current threats facing the countries of the hemisphere.

Nevertheless, in the region's current context, we must be wary of the impact that the implementation of this new concept of security might have on the democracies and the public security systems of Latin American countries.

First, the treatment of a variety of issues under the lens of security opens the door to the securitization of political, social, and economic agendas. This risk is heightened by the broad definition of terrorism and the expansive vision of what signifies a threat to security used by the United States after the September 11 attacks.

Second, the broad and diffuse formulation of the OAS concept of security blurs the line between the concepts of defense and public security. As we saw in the examples described above, the practical consequence of this process is the alteration of the traditional functions of the armed forces to involve them in matters of internal or public security. This situation could contribute to the tendency of re-militarization of internal security produced in the last few years beginning with the involvement of the armed forces in roles that do not correspond to the defense of

the State. This could derail the efforts by the governments of the region to subordinate the armed forces to civilian democratic institutions.

Endnotes

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- ² Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences”, in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
- ³ Ibid.
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- ⁵ “Para que no se olvide, 12-13 de febrero 2003,” Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB), Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos y Mártires por la Liberación Nacional (ASOFAMD), Diakonia, Bolivia, 2004.
- ⁶ Juan Ramón Quintana, “Bolivia: Militares y Policías. Fuego cruzado en democracia,” draft held by author.
- ⁷ Sigrid Arzt, “La militarización de la Procuraduría General de la República: Riesgos para la democracia mexicana,” Document requested by the Project for the Reform of Justice Administration in Mexico, Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies, San Diego, May 15, 2003, p.4, available at www.repositories.cdlib.org/usmex/prajm/arzt/.
- ⁸ Between 1985 and 1995, homicides in Brazil increased from 13,910 to 37,129. See Mezquita Neto and Loche, “Police-Community Partnership in Brazil,” in *Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State*, Edited by Hugo Frühling and Joseph S. Tulchin with Heather A. Golding, Baltimore and London: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
- ⁹ It is important to mention that in Brazil, preventive police (in charge of patrolling the streets) are denominated military police and are therefore militarized security forces in terms of their practices, structures, and control mechanisms.
- ¹⁰ This occurred in 1994 with Operations Rio I and II; in 2003 the military occupation of the Rio de Janeiro favelas was preceded by the invocation of terrorism as justification for this measure by then Rio de Janeiro governor Rosinha Garotinho. See “Una guerra inútil. Drogas y violencia en Brasil,” Editorial, *TNI*, November 2004; Paul E. Amar, “Reform in Rio: Reconsidering the Myths of Crime and Violence,” *NACLA*, September/October 2003; “El Ejército combatirá a los narcos en Río,” *La Nación*, Buenos Aires, February 28, 2003.
- ¹¹ *Folha de Sao Paulo*, “Lei do Abate só vai permitir ataques a avioes de tráfico,” July, 2004.
- ¹² Transnational Institute, “Una Guerra Inútil: Droga y Violencia en el Brasil”, *TNI Briefings* No. 2004/8, November 2004.
- ¹³ “Exército chega a regioa onde morreu irma Dorothy e já cercam pistas de pouso,” *Amazonia.org*, February 18, 2005.
- ¹⁴ Mezquita Neto and Loche, op. cit.

- ¹⁵ Constitución Nacional, leyes 23.554 de Defensa Nacional y 24.059 de Seguridad Interior.
- ¹⁶ *La Nación*, "Nacionalizar la inseguridad", 11 septiembre de 2004.
- ¹⁷ According to the sectors that made this proposal, the participation of the armed forces could be direct, that is to say, repressing the social protests, or indirect, that is through the intervention of the armed forces in areas of intelligence of different social sectors.
- ¹⁸ Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, December 2003.
- ¹⁹ U.S. Southern Command, "Posture Statement of Gen. James T. Hill," U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, before the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, March 24, 2004. Available at: <http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-24hill.html>
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ This does not mean that the two guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN) and the paramilitary group (AUC) do not commit terrorist acts as part of their strategies.
- ²² *Indebido Proceso: Los juicios antiterroristas, los tribunales militares y los Mapuche en el Sur de Chile*, Human Rights Watch y Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, New York, October 2004.
- ²³ Ibid, p. 5.
- ²⁴ U.S. Southern Command, "Posture Statement of Gen. James T. Hill," op. cit. For more in depth analysis see: "Blurring the lines: Trends in U.S military programs with Latin America," Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Center for International Policy and WOLA, Washington, DC, September, 2004.
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- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ U.S. Southern Command, "Posture Statement of Gen. Bantz Craddock", U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, before the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, March 9, 2005. Available at: <http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/109thcongress/FY06%20Budget%20Misc/Southcom3-9-05.pdf>
- ²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, Remarks by Secretary

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The threat of new entrants Porter created affects the competitive environment for the existing competitors and influences the ability of existing firms to achieve profitability. For example, a high threat of entry means new competitors are likely to be attracted to the profits of the industry and can enter the industry with ease. New competitors entering the marketplace can either threaten or decrease the market share and profitability of existing competitors and may result in changes to existing product quality or price levels. On the other hand, a low threat of entry makes an industry less competitive and increases profit potential for the existing firms. New entrants are deterred by barriers to entry. Barriers to Entry. Several factors determine the degree of the threat of new entrants to an industry. The concept of the threat itself should be viewed as follows: it is a combination of various factors and conditions that can create a danger to the vital interests of society, the state and the individual. In order to protect both public and personal interests, certain tools were created. These include maintaining the balance of interests of the state and the individual, the legality and mutual responsibility of the subjects and society. If we consider the concept of security of citizens somewhat wider, it is worth paying attention to life and factors that are a potential threat to it. For a more objective assessment of the issue of protection, a separate educational area, called "Life Safety", was developed.