



Identity, Culture and Politics, Vol 5, Nos. 1 & 2, 2004, pp. 1-18
© CODESRIA & ICES, 2004 (ISSN 0851-2914)

Forming an Asian Modern: Capitalist Modernity, Culture, 'East Asia' and Post-Colonial Singapore

C. J. W.-L. Wee*

Abstract

The paper enquires what economic development and the positing of an 'Asian modern' meant in cultural-identitarian terms for the post-colonial city-state of Singapore—one of the Mini Dragons which championed the efficacy of 'Asian values' for development—during the 1980s-1990s, during the height of the 'Asian economic miracle'. The idea of national or regional culture became part of conflictual field in which cultural differences were mobilised in the service of transnational and national politics played by states such as Singapore and Malaysia. The goal was to ensure that Singapore continued to have a seat at global capitalism's table, even while proclaiming a culturally distinct capitalist modernity that could be said to have become different from an inherited Western-colonial modernity. The reality, however, was more that the city-state's instrumental deployment of culture indicated the deliberate loss of cultural autochthony to the pragmatic need to create an effective economic culture. This small-but-crucial hub for the transmission of transnational capital may be indicative of identity concerns when placed under the pressure to succeed under the presence of an increasingly dominant neo-liberal capitalism. Much 'post-colonial' research has analysed how Euro-American colonialism, travel and exploration have produced 'the rest of the world' for the West. A major concern of this paper is also to suggest that it is now time to ask how the post-colonised 'rest of the world' produces itself out of the very same modern colonial experiences.

Résumé

Cette communication s'intéresse à la définition du développement économique et du postulat de l'«Asiatique moderne» en termes culturels et de l'identité, dans le cas de la ville-État post-coloniale de Singapour (un des mini-dragons qui a su appliquer à la perfection les «valeurs asiatiques» dans une perspective de

* Teaches literature and cultural theory at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He was formerly a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and is the author of *Culture, Empire, and the Question of Being Modern* (Lexington Books, 2003) and the editor of *Local Cultures and the 'New Asia': The State, Culture, and Capitalism in Southeast Asia* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). Email: cjwee11@yahoo.com.sg

développement), dans les années 1980 et 1990, en plein «miracle économique asiatique». L'idée d'une culture nationale ou régionale participait d'un champ conflictuel dans lequel les différences culturelles étaient mobilisées au service de la politique transnationale et nationale déployée par des États tels que Singapour et la Malaisie. L'objectif était de s'assurer que Singapour continuerait d'avoir une place à la table du capitalisme mondial, même si cette ville-État proclamait une modernité capitaliste culturellement différente, différente de l'héritage de la modernité occidentale / coloniale. Dans la réalité, l'utilisation stratégique de la culture par Singapour était le signe d'une perte délibérée de l'autochtonie culturelle au profit du besoin pragmatique de création d'une culture économique efficace. Cette position centrale «petite-mais-incontournable» de transmission de capital transnational pourrait fort bien révéler des problèmes identitaires, lorsque l'on se retrouve en présence d'un capitalisme néo-libéral de plus en plus dominant. De nombreuses recherches «post-coloniales» ont analysé la manière dont le colonialisme, les expéditions et les explorations euro-américaines ont produit «le reste du monde» dans l'intérêt de l'Occident. Cette communication suggère également qu'il est temps de se demander comment le «reste du monde» post-colonisé se produit en dehors des mêmes expériences coloniales modernes.

... the notion of an authentic culture as an autonomous internally coherent universe is no longer sustainable [in either the First or the Third Worlds,] except perhaps as a 'useful fiction' or as a revealing distortion.—Renato Rosaldo (1989).¹

Present Anglo-American post-colonial and cultural theory often uses the idea of *the* post-colonial state. Increasingly, though, cultural criticism is coming to terms with the idea that there is no single or definite article here. The post-colonial age started on midnight, 14 August 1947, leading to supposedly sovereign states under the industrial-capitalist world order. A shift could be said to occur, from about the 1980s onwards, when a more fluid, market-driven world became

obvious, one in which the state was, increasingly, held to be more in crisis against supranational forces. However, even within such a broad narrative, we should not make the post-colony out to be too internally coherent: the post-colony is often 'chaotically pluralistic'.²

This essay looks at the question of post-colonial state formation by investigating the tiny city-state of Singapore. I enquire what economic development in the 1980s—the start of the 'second' post-colonial 'age'—meant in cultural-identitarian terms for Singapore as one of the Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) in East and Southeast Asia during their period of spectacular growth until the 1997 Asian economic crisis, combined with Japan's financial problems, marked the end of the 'East Asian Miracle'. Singapore's post-coloniality represents a distinctive story since 1965, the year of its independence, of an ongoing and in some ways unsurprising attempt to match the West in its modernity,³ one in which, more surprisingly, suppressed not only the political dimensions of democratic life, but also the cultural dimensions, whether taken in their high-cultural/aesthetic or anthropological senses. Only an industrial and commercial understanding of culture was left, in which manufacturing and productive institutions as the collective basis of social life became the new cultural system. However, this development was recognised only as the establishment of a universal rationality for nation-building purposes, even as Singapore has become the most 'Western' and the most pro-West of Southeast Asian societies.

The little city-state thus stands for a dynamic and, in a way, an iconic quasi-authoritarian, paternalistic and bland, multicultural Utopianism dependent upon and adapted from the West, one in which cultural difference and historical and racist 'irrationalities' were suppressed, homogenised or sanitised in the name of capitalist modernity's pure truths. It offers a case study of 'developmentalism' taken very seriously—perhaps in extremis. And yet, despite this strident late-modernity—one that now (possibly predictably) valorises the United States's version of the 'West' as the acme of global modernity itself—this Southeast Asian city-state obviously can never be a part of the West. This particular nexus of issues constitutes Singapore's anomalous position in the region.

In the 1980s, though, the People's Action Party (PAP) government learnt that cultural identity actually could be deployed instrumentally for economic purposes. Singapore was a part of a group of NIEs that imagined itself as a region—as an East Asian 'Us'. The 'Asian values' discourse of the 1980s-mid-1990s was a major attempt at imagining a collective identity that entailed new forms of social discipline as a response to the challenges posed by global capital. It was an odd form of resistance conducted so as to participate more effectively within 'Universal' capitalism. Arjun Appadurai has spoken of how 'culture' has become a conflictual field in which there is 'the conscious mobilization of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or transnational politics', a political thrust he calls 'culturalism'.⁴ One should not assume that such action is the prerogative only of ethnic groups and New Social Movements; nation-states can play this game too, and the various versions of 'East Asia' that emerged from the 1980s onwards were statist manifestations of this strategy, one which I have elsewhere called a 'national culturalism'.⁵

One cannot assume that capitalist modernity 'writes' itself on the post-colonial world in any obviously predictable manner. Neither is the issue one whether we are all modern or not; as historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has commented, 'We are all, one way or another, products of world capitalism and the institutions, practices, and ideas that have accompanied it.'⁶ The issue is more what the particular society one is looking at has made of its modern colonial 'inheritance'—if that is the term we want. In Singapore's case, subjectivity and identity—indeed 'culture' writ large—entirely came under the gun, and the 'West' it drew upon (and still desires to match up to) for its post-colonial national construction became hidden under its 1980s neo-Asianism. The result of this instrumental attitude towards culture is that the city-state has deliberately forsaken cultural autochthony in many aspects of its overall development, certainly in its local identity, to its detriment. The economic dimension takes precedence over all others, the political and the cultural having been systematically suppressed since the 1960s. The PAP has used the reforming impulse within the cultural-intellectual inheritance of the post-war European welfare state (certainly in its English Fabian version) of active state intervention not only in the economic cycle but also in what Jürgen Habermas calls the 'life-worlds' of its citizens. While, of course, life-worlds have always been colonised by market forces and administrative systems, what is pertinent here is the extent to which the PAP state is committed to the instrumentalising notion of modernity as a tool of its nation-building. I suspect that more than other societies which have desired economic growth, the 'reification and commodification [of economic forms]... have become so universalized as to seem well-nigh natural and organic entities'.⁷

Now, with the Southeast Asian region in a weakened economic position since the Asian economic crisis of 1997, when the Thai baht was devalued, the city-state has abandoned the notion of a regional Asian Modern back towards a more-direct affirmation of global capitalism as universal truth, a position similar to its immediate post-independence stance. We have yet to fully comprehend how what was once called 'modernisation' (and later, 'globalisation') was mapped onto the literal and also quasi-post-colonies of Southeast and East Asia.

Engineering the 'Arrival' of the Asian Modern

Post-colonial Singapore has become an Asian poster-child (if a somewhat humourless one) of globalisation, having transcended its 1960s Third-World status to being touted as part of the 'East Asian Miracle' by the World Bank in 1993. This tiny city-state of about 3.2 millions (four millions with non-Singaporeans) achieved this status via a state-imposed paradigm of modernisation. Its small size allowed the PAP government to force a great deal of society and most of Singapore's productive and reproductive articulations under the PAP's control. Japan's neo-mercantilism—if not its nationalism—also offered an example of how late development could be achieved. This section examines the fate of 'culture' in the city-state's development in the years after decolonisation to the mid-1990s.

The PAP government, in power since 1959, when Singapore gained self-rule from Great Britain, has worked at conditioning the island's complex plural society for the overwhelming purpose of rationalist development. The various Chinese (the largest ethnic group), Malay (or other ethnic groups which subscribed to Islam), Indian (mainly Tamilian) and 'Eurasian' communities made for a complex and sometimes incendiary ethnic mix. There had been communal riots in July 1964, started during the Prophet Mohammed's birthday, and also the persistent suspicion until the late 1970s that Chinese-culture champions were either communalists or communists (or possibly communist sympathisers). As a consequence, from the 1960s, society was urbanised and traditional social organisation was replaced with economically rational forms based on function and efficiency. The Anglicised, bourgeois leadership was scornful of 'retrograde' Asian cultural identities and traditions. As for high culture, that did not have a ghost of a chance of flourishing in a significant way in this period.⁸

That national historiography that came about reflected this discomfort with culture. What was distinctive of former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew and his lieutenants' nation-building was their disdain for any state-supported history of the nation stretching back into a distant origin—rejecting the essentialising functions of history connected with the discursive construction of nationalism—and the irrationalities of cultural and racial identities that they thought dogged European and other Asian attempts at nation-building.⁹ The 'occult instability' that Frantz Fanon recognised at the heart of the nation seemed no more a secret in the Malay Peninsula than in Africa. PAP leaders denied culture's autonomy and attempted a complete consistency in their modern nation-building.

The more immediate issue for the PAP in the wake of decolonisation, and then the planned pullout of British troops east of Suez by 1968—and with that the potential loss of large numbers of jobs in the city-state associated with the British military bases—was economic sur-

vival. Establishing calm and stability among its multi-ethnic citizens was but one part of this broader concern. The island's immediate economy thus has its origins in the mid-1960s. Southeast Asia's post-war instability—the communist action known as the Malayan Emergency, North Vietnamese communism, the Indonesian Confrontation with Malaysia, and Singapore's ejection from Malaysia in 1965—led the PAP state to attracting in foreign direct investment (FDI) from the advanced West and Japan to leapfrog development. This positive attitude to multinational capital was in stark contrast with much of the post-colonial world's attitude regarding what then was called 'neo-colonialism'. In the midst of the Cold War, the city-state located itself definitively within First-World capitalist modernity.

Development from the 1960s to the 1990s might be described in general as a 'disciplinary modernisation'. By the late 1960s, apart from inter-racial issues, the government had effectively brought to heel the leftist political opposition which, when still part of the PAP, had ensured the party's early electoral victories. The government also limited the procedural and other mechanisms that would allow for strong participation and expression of the plurality of socio-political and ethnic forces. The result was a partial welfare state (adapted from the British colonial home model) that provided public subsidies in services and housing and invested social relations in their entirety. It became a capitalist society that contradictorily, in ideological terms, but self-consciously practised interventionism within its boundaries but supported liberal free trade outside it.

Capitalism itself is a cultural form (or forms), and for it to be embedded in ways amenable to multinational companies, more proletarians had to be formed out of farmers in the *kampongs* (Malay: villages), a professionalised managerial class created, consumerism encouraged, and so forth. As indicated in the introduction, this was the one form of culture that the PAP did foster. The enforced rationalising modernity was in keeping with the universalistic teleological thinking of the 1960s, and the cultural logic of capital that underlay modernisation theory. One key policy initiative was a tremendous emphasis on the teaching of the English language—though taught as a sort of technical language to make it culturally 'neutral'—so as to link the new nation with the international economy, given the demise of a possible Malaysian common market. 'Culture' became a residual category to be revamped or instrumentalised as part of the radical reconstruction of subjectivity itself for the economy.

What starts to emerge is, to say the least, an odd modernity. And yet, for some observers, the city-state's modernity seems obvious: it represents a form of capitalism that, because it has landed on Asian soil, has run amok. Singapore is a whole society subjugated to the needs of capital. What happened to the other aspects of modern life that should accompany industrial modernity—literature, music and the visual arts, the achievements that we need to be cultured in the modern world, in fact of what it means to be deeply modern? Why did the PAP regime not value the high symbolic goods that represented one major part of the spectrum of human autonomy? Even though the modernisation process might diminish the role of culture and the symbolic market as a whole, it does not suppress it beyond a degree (take, for instance, the romantic revolt against a narrow socio-economic modernisation in the very homeland of the Industrial Revolution, as documented by Raymond Williams¹⁰), and certainly not to the level the city-state has achieved. If, as anthropologist Néstor García Canclini has argued,

that 'the most-reiterated hypothesis in the literature on Latin American modernity... [is that they] have had an exuberant modernism with a deficient modernization',¹¹ then Singapore represents the near-opposite case, an exuberant socio-economic modernisation with a deficient cultural modernism¹²—though it is possible to take the PAP state's socio-cultural engineering itself as a particular critical symbolic act.¹³

We also could consider the issue of national identity based on an embedded past, the traditional or historical identities that leads to a rooted but modern nation-ness: why did the PAP state eschew such identities that we might expect to be important to a new state?¹⁴ As early as 1956, in the colonial legislative assembly, Lee Kuan Yew used the word 'primordial' in relation to the gut issues that fueled the educational and identity concerns of the various ethnic groups on the island: 'I have used the word "primordial" once and it brought a rebuke from the hon. Mr [G. A. P.] Sutherland [a nominated assemblyman], but that was perhaps he does not understand these [socially incendiary and complicated] things.'¹⁵ Singapore's statist Asian modern by and large excluded primordial sentiments and popular culture—folklore, ethnic cultures and traditions—from the nation-building process.

Despite these apparent distortions of Western modernity, though, some would say the city-state still follows the simple determinations of capital, but then would Singapore's modernity be a sort of twisted or discrepant extension, or an attempt at mimesis gone amiss? Or perhaps, if one is take the claims seriously of both detractors and supporters of this position in both East Asia and the advanced industrial West, this distortion is the result of local/regional (Asian rather than Asianised) capitalisms being shaped by 'Asian' cultures. In the process alternative modernities based on indigenous value systems could be conceived as starting to challenge Western capitalism and worldwide US cultural hegemony, at least before the Asian economic crisis transpired.

In general, such views as discussed above on Singapore's modernity suggesting that the city-state, along with the other Tiger and emerging Southeast Asian economies¹⁶ in the 1980s-1990s, represent distorted modernities constitute a 'useful fiction', to use Renato Rosaldo's words that appear as the epigraph to this essay, that covers up or disavows the fact that capitalism is one phenomenon. At the same time, we also must recognise that this 'one-ness' does not imply that capitalist modernity will be the same everywhere: it is neither monolithic nor unified.

Twists and Turns...

Apparently contradictory developments from the early 1980s onwards indicated that repressed 'culture', in its many definitions, was making a return. There were changes in the way ethnicity was managed, such that individual ethnic identities came to be emphasised by the state: a 're-racialisation' or 're-ethnicising' of local peoples into hyphenated categories of citizenry (e.g., Chinese- and Malay-Singaporeans) occurred; Chinese identity was valorised via a Confucianist discourse; later, a pan-Asian values discourse evolved; diasporic or immigrant history, though set definitively in a nationalist framework, was elevated; even high aesthetic culture was incorporated (admittedly very slowly) as part of the state's development

agenda formally from 1989.¹⁷ An Asian modernity was asserted, even while the state supported a universal form of free-tradist and neo-liberal economics that became dominant after the 1989 collapse of the USSR.

'Culture' had returned, but in an odd way. The earlier rationalising, modernist imperatives had not disappeared. The difference was that culture was now seen to be able to support economic development. The re-ethnicising of the city-state and its insertion into the region 'Asia' through the Asian values discourse in reality reinforced and did not contest a presumption of capitalism's universal status by allowing the national state—now more subject to transnational corporatist forces—greater individual space to manoeuvre. The oppositional quality of the discourse gave Singapore (and the others that used it) a specific agenda to protect the more contentious practices (e.g., a less-democratic polity; suppressed trade union activities) that helped maintain its position within global capitalism.¹⁸ New opportunities in China from 1978, as Deng Xiaoping instituted economic reforms, was another key reason for stressing the 'Sinic' qualities of New Asia's capitalist identity; this was the call and the romance of 'network' (guanxi) capitalism.

A series of external intellectual factors were instrumental in enabling or empowering the discussion of an Asian capitalism. One was Japan's success, and the legitimisation of 'non-Western' ideas of capitalism as set out in Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* (1979).¹⁹ Herman Kahn in *World Economic Development* (1979) spoke of a link between neo-Confucianism and Japanese success. In 1980, Roderick MacFarquhar wrote of the 'post-Confucian challenge' in the pro-neo-liberal magazine, *The Economist*, and the late Harvard professor, Edwin O. Reishauer, wrote of the 'Sinic World', in *Foreign Affairs*. By 1987, George Lodge and Ezra Vogel were arguing in *Ideology and National Competitiveness* for two economic types in the forms of communitarian and individualistic national ideologies. American intellectuals, Asian and white—and not only Tu Wei-ming, one of the leading voices for a sort of Confucian modernity²⁰—were complicit in authorising the construction the New Asia. And thus, a non-retrograde, ethnically Asian capitalist mode partially if not completely 'Other' to the liberal West was conceivable.

The emergence of a multicentric world order that had North American and European zones and an Asian-Pacific zone by the 1980s allowed the aggressive representation of an indigenus/local relationship between culture and capitalist modernity. However, the 'Asian values' discourse of the 1980s-1990s—one which Singapore's senior minister Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia's Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Hong Kong's Tung Chee Hwa were among the foremost champions—that at times belligerently self-represented a 'neo-traditional' Asian modernity and cultural identity Other to the West's tainted, individualist modernity had subsided by the mid-1990s, save for qualified pronouncements by Lee, a champion of Confucian values. That discourse was an ideological fantasy of difference, one that apparently contested a capitalism that the PAP itself has taken continually to be universal.

There were, of course, 'real' reasons for the idea of an emerging multicentric economic order: a 'flexible' regime of accumulation had developed, and this weakened nationally rooted 'Fordist-Keynesian' labour practices, consumption habits and technological innovations. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) evolved, and with them, the New International Division of

Labour (NIDL). Companies set up factories outside the West, in developing societies. Transport and communications developments meant that semi-peripheral units like Hong Kong and Singapore became hubs in the transnational flow of capital. Fortuitous circumstances helped make Singapore an early beneficiary of such developments. The city-state gained its independence from Malaysia²¹ at a point when a gradual decentering of production was beginning in the advanced economies, and gained an early entrance into the field. Combined with this was the island's geographical location at a crossroads of international trade. Its small territorial size also meant that the PAP was able to comfortably control an entire society. The point when Singapore transcended its Third World status in the 1970s was also when cultural distinctiveness was marshalled to sustain competitiveness.

One major regional circumstance that contributed to the change in identitarian politics needs to be investigated in a little more detail at this point, and this is Japan's importance in the 1980s. As is well-known, Japan's stupendous economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s threw a spanner in the works of modernisation theory; as some commentators note:

where the Japanese tradition till then had been seen as an obstacle in the path of rationalization/modernization, to be gradually transcended as Westernization advanced, now the Japanese tradition was redeemed and proclaimed a uniquely suited vessel for modernization by a new school that developed around the 'unique Japan' hypothesis.²²

Japan, significantly, was now a model for modernisation—maybe, a new, not-entirely-Western modernity itself. Consequently, in 1979, Ezra Vogel published *Japan as Number One*, and in December 1981, former-Malaysian prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad announced his 'Look East' policy, in the midst of notable local and expatriate opposition, which sought to introduce within Malaysia the Japanese work ethic and managerial systems.²³ Thus, the possibility of envisioning a Japanese modernity was brought about, and with that, the new option that other countries could now choose to 'Japanise' rather than 'Westernise' in their modernisation trajectories. (Ogura Kazuo, for instance, confidently stated that: 'The "Asian" elements that have supported Japan's economic development [though there is the question of how accurately these can be defined] have come to serve as a model for the world...').²⁴ The stage was set for the possible imagining of other Asian modernities.

The success of a Japanese-style modernity surely has at least partially contributed to the development of what Saito Seiichiro has called 'the new Asianism' in Japan:²⁵ various Japanese, by the late 1980s, and of course before the impact of the deflating bubble economy was apparent, were casting their gaze upon East Asia (here taken to include Southeast Asia). Nakanishi Terumasa has suggested a number of reasons for this gaze: one would be Japan's attempt to redefine its international identity in the post-Cold War world; another is, having completed the industrial catch-up with the West, 're-Asianisation' offered a new perspective on the Japanese place in the global scene; and last, but not least, is the economic vigour and attraction of the Little Tigers, as well of the newer Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which promised new vistas for economic activity.²⁶ The following quotation from an article by President Kobayashi Yotaro of Fuji Xerox has been cited to indicate that 'Japan's return to Asia disguises its economic orientation with a nostalgic justifi-

cation':²⁷ 'Just as Gorbachev once declared that Russia's home was in Europe, so it is natural for us to say that Japan's home is in Asia, not in the United States or Europe.'²⁸ There is also the Liberal Democratic Party's Ishihara Shintaro's view that Japanese militarism was the result of a mindless mimicry of Euro-American 'colonialism'. With that in the past, Japan can return to a supposed earlier belief that 'its transformation into an industrial and military power was based on the doctrine that prosperity for the Asian region should be achieved with Japan as its nucleus'.²⁹ This sounded like a call for Japanese hegemony if not domination over East Asia.

What does Japanese desire for increased influence in Southeast Asia in the 1980s and early 1990s say of Japan's standing among Singapore's political elites at a point when their discourse on East Asian modernity manifested their willingness to take on some of the presuppositions (individualism and individual rights) in Western modernity? 'Japan' as an idea does play a role in the discourse—Japan is, after all, the first Asian nation to achieve a triumphal modernity. But, in the end, it is not seen as possessing the foundational culture of an Asian modernity—that privilege goes to China. Japan is seen as possessing neither the essence of a neo-Confucian modernity nor the attraction of the West. Nonetheless, Japan's success counts for much in authorising a New Asia discourse and, more specifically, an idea of 'East Asia' that now contains entities such as Malaysia and Singapore that cartographically had been imagined earlier as being part of 'Southern Asia'.

Obviously, it should not be assumed (though it had been, clearly, by some) that a fundamental civilisational entity called 'Asia' exists, possessing a possibly marketable though culture-based strategy for economic development.³⁰ Governments in Singapore and Malaysia used this discourse strategically for their own socio-political agendas. No less an academic personage than Ezra Vogel tells us that while specific 'situational factors' account for East Asian industrialisation, 'this achievement cannot be separated from the institutional practices and underlying attitudes... that [East Asian]... absorbed in growing up in their culture'.³¹ The once reprehensible thing called 'Asian tradition' now had been rehabilitated, and the Japanese story has been importantly instrumental in this, as earlier mentioned. This is a major reference point in the discourse.

In October 1993, then-Malaysian finance minister Anwar Ibrahim addressed the Asian Forum of Parliamentarians: 'Western capitalism attempts to displace traditions, while we in East Asia integrate the positive values of modern technology and commercial practice.'³² Now East Asia also contains not only Southeast Asian Chinese but also Muslim cultures—and this coming from a former Muslim youth radical, who showed a decided intellectual flair as a political leader.³³ This new East Asia has learnt that modernity can be ethnicised.

The diversity of the news magazines and papers in the 1980s-1990s, Asian and Western, that seemed to agree on the role of traditional, community-oriented Asian values in the Asian 'miracle' was amazing. The role of the mass media in the ongoing construction of 'East Asia' loudly calls out for serious investigation. It would shed light on the complex adversarial collusion between the 'Occident' and the 'Orient' in the reformulation of Oriental cultural identity within the Great Game of global capitalism.³⁴ *Asiaweek*, published from Hong Kong, offered the USA Asian values for its salvation: 'Americans' own [best] values [are] found nowadays

across the Pacific in family-centered Asian cultures which prize respect for elders, upright morals, discipline and hard work.³⁵ China, *Le Monde* reported to its readers, 'is fascinated by the two models of Asian economic success represented by Singapore and South Korea'.³⁶

What is noticeable is that in most references, 'East Asia' invokes a broad Sinic quality but only a limited Japanese quality. (South Asia did not warrant much mention in this period, though of course since the late 1990s, India's economic potential has slowly returned to the main stage of world attention.) Vogel, for example, writes of an 'industrial neo-Confucianism'. Certainly, he says one of the situational (but not foundational) factors to be taken into account when examining the Little Tigers is 'The Japanese Model'. 'After World War II, only the governments of South Korea and Singapore consciously studied the Japanese experience in detail... [but all four] saw the crucial role of government in guiding [economic] changes. Having the Japanese model provided both the confidence that they too could succeed and a perspective on how to succeed.'³⁷ Thus, while Japan, as earlier stated, was a trailblazer, Japan's specific contribution to Asian modernity he takes to be a but not the factor involved. Vogel then proceeds to identify four Confucian 'clusters of institutions and traditional attitudes' common to the Little Tigers, and though adapted, to Japan itself: first, a meritocratic elite; second, an entrance examination for bureaucrats; third, the importance of the group; and finally, self-cultivation.³⁸ Thus, the cultural originary moment of Asian modernity belongs to China's and not Japan's deep past.

The entire discussion thus far indicates that the ambiguous and contradictory phenomena at the heart of forming a modern society are real enough. As elsewhere, Reason and a triumphant modernity become exposed as not being as autonomous as some might still proclaim them to be: some PAP leaders since the late 1970s did become uneasy with the materialism which has developed from their systematic attempts to eradicate local cultures in the interests of creating a rational society. The move to elevating 'Asian values' also served as a basis for grounding an indigenised capitalism, even if also an attempt to entrench the ruling party as an essential part of the nation's life, partially developed from a sense that a moral or cultural crisis may exist, even while the state's overall commitment to universal development and a material view of the world made such considerations implausible. Many PAP leaders are trapped in a reductive or, perhaps, a somewhat too literally materialist worldview in which the 'spiritual', no matter how vaguely taken, can only be the superstructural expression of the economic base—a 'vulgar' Marxist assumption of economics and culture/consciousness in pro-capitalist 'Singapore, Inc.'

Singapore may be indicative, if not representative, of identity concerns at the level of the city-state trying to function as a nation-state when placed under pressure to survive and even flourish under the conditions of economies that were burgeoning in the USA as well as regionally. How, in this context, was one to develop a state-sponsored national culture able to mobilise its society towards the economic goal of becoming a first-world society? The city-state's post-independence history has seen the global given precedence over the local, with a later statist attempt to invent a trans-local/regional neo-traditional identity. The very lack of representativeness—its small population and the lack of territory—helped rather than hindered this objective because Singapore becomes a contained laboratory test-case of the

post-colonial struggle to be as modern and economically successful as the West is thought to be modern.

Singapore's example of managed culture also moves attention away both from cultural contestation from the margins and the idea of the West and the Rest—that is, from a question of centre and margin—to semi-peripheral states and the institutions of advanced capitalism. The larger context for this phenomenon, as already has been suggested, is the rise of the East and Southeast Asian trading economies and intra-regional integration, which have contributed to capitalism being more multicentric. Such developments offer opportunities for developing national economies or 'emerging markets' to participate in a globalising economy. But, as Singapore illustrates, this participation can create the need for alternative identity and political legitimacy foci. But can such construction really come about if there is already an a priori assumption that culture is only 'there' to be used?

The Problem of Planning—and a Revamped Role for Culture

The PAP government's deployment of the 'modern' should be contextualised within the once-commanding dream of what the modern world should undergo: endless renovation. It is now hard to think that anyone could believe that the slate could be cleaned and the new inscribed. While many critics consider the PAP state 'conservative', even 'reactionary', for its pro-capitalist but illiberal politico-cultural orientation, the way the 'modern' has been adapted might be not unreasonably described as 'radical'.

Southeast Asian instability, Singapore's size and the 'Chinese' identity parts of Southeast Asia resulted in a persistent 'survivalist' theme in the PAP's representation of the city-state at home and overseas. Regional instability all the more seemed to emphasise the need for tight discipline under a centralised bureaucracy in the interests of political and economic survival. It has been argued that by repeatedly focusing anxiety on the island-state's vulnerability, the state's originating agency is periodically ratified, and its access to the instruments of power for national protection continually consolidated.³⁹ And so—contradictorily, if taken in ideologically—there developed a city-state that strongly supported the free market outside its borders while planning and the consistent interference in the realm of the private became the hallmarks of the PAP's rule within the island.

The question then arises: how successful was the PAP in planning Singapore as a society 'fit' for capitalist modernisation? Too successful, is the answer. For many years, the state has effectively married socialism's (or at least social democracy's) penchant for planning with the belief in the free market—hence, the symbolic significance of Singapore's hosting the first ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation in December 1996. What has been 'distracting' for the government is any form of political disquisition, or the arts, for that matter. While these two forms of human activity are not the same category of action, they do overlap, they both practise critical discrimination. As Perry Anderson observes, 'Abstention from criticism, in either, is subscription.'⁴⁰ Too much trust in the plan always is dangerous, if we are to accept Habermas's position on this, 'because modernized societies with their functional interdependencies go beyond the dimensions of living conditions that could be gauged by the

imagination of the planner'.⁴¹ The result of such over-planning in Singapore is a passive and pacified population now possibly unable to rise to the challenges of a post-Cold War, post-Asian economic crisis world. I shall return to this.

Such planning as took place, obviously, could only apply to the economic, political and cultural circumstances within the island. The next question, then, would be: how sovereign was the post-colonial city-state within the politico-economic ambit of what might be described as the 'globalising West' (as it may be called) it chose to participate within? The answer seems to be that while agency did matter, choice was circumscribed by the larger context of multinational capitalism—by the at-least-incipient governmentality of the 'West' disseminated into the 'globe'.

The 1997-2000 Asian economic crisis triggered by the devaluation of the Thai baht, along with the consequences of the disappearance of the Cold War threat in East and Southeast Asia, has led to Singapore being less able and also less willing to exercise the protection the state once offered, for example, to local banks, giving them some shelter from foreign banks in the retail sector. The solution to a weakened state seems to lie in trying to internalise the perceived Outside of multinational capitalism even more thoroughly. The Asian crisis, which Singapore weathered fairly well, but which allowed the International Monetary Fund into the region more decisively via their rescue packages for Indonesia and Thailand, and with that the demand for further structural reform, indirectly left the PAP with the question, 'Whither the Southeast/East Asian protective-interventionist state?' Once, the USA seemed to tolerate it, but now, less so. Though the city-state was a fairly open economy, it now had to become even more open. While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) waffles over the proposed ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Singapore has since the crisis pursued bilateral free-trade arrangements with the USA, Europe and Japan so as not to be 'trapped' by the region, as it were.

Within its own borders, the PAP has hastened (cautious) economic de-regulation. The government decided that the older paradigm of capitalist modernisation they had used now needed re-tooling. There needs to exist less-conformist subjectivities and a vibrant socio-cultural life. This, the government hopes, will result in a 'creative' and therefore less-stifled productive population that will become an autonomous mass with intelligent productivity. Obviously, these hopes are at odds with the favoured disciplinary modalities of rule. The fear remains that intelligent productivity may lead to democratic power; and yet the ongoing re-invention of Singapore, the government itself argues, depends on the very creation of the autonomous forces of productive co-operation supposed to be the sine qua non of the New Economy. They will not or, possibly, cannot recognise that more than ever, their earlier assumptions of polarised oppositions between political economy and culture, the material and the discursive, are obsolete, even as the policy arguments that emerged from the late 1990s contended that the economic and societal question of the Information Economy means that 'ideas' as capital brings culture to the forefront of public policy.

The issue now, it has been argued, is how innovation—that is to say, originality in ideas—can be stimulated. Even while the dreams for a New Economy have been deflated with the collapse of high-tech/dot.com equities and companies in 2001, the PAP is still committed to

championing 'creativity' as necessary for general economic innovation. Of course, this means that the government is starting to 'programme' creativity (and therefore a 'chaotic' individualism) into the city-state. Contradictory as this sounds, it follows faithfully some policy experts' recommendations⁴²—and indeed with the PAP's commitment to central planning.

Part and parcel of this new emphasis on culture is the desire to become a truly Global City. In 1992, the government announced, with its confidence in social engineering, that Singapore should be a Global City for the Arts,⁴³ for a Global City cannot be a philistine one. Certainly, productive cultural energy exists: the theatre and visual arts scenes have since the 1980s grappled with such concerns as modernisation/globalisation, memory and the significance of cultural and ethnic heritage—dealing with issues suppressed since independence. However, the PAP itself has not transcended its instrumentalist approach to 'culture'.⁴⁴

The way forward certainly is not clear to the city-state's citizens, despite all the initiatives the PAP state has launched to help the city-state survive and continue to flourish in the twenty-first century. *Time Magazine* proclaimed on 19 July 1999: Singapore Swings' and now 'Lightens Up'. It cautioned though, that the island was 'Changing, [but] not [completely] changed.' The government, despite this qualification, seemed satisfied with the story. To the question as to whether there is a contradiction between 'the strong political line' and a 'younger and ... more creative generation', Lee Hsien Loong, a deputy prime minister, the older son of Lee Kuan Yew and, since 2004, the present prime minister, replied: 'Our job is to try and to represent a middle ground...'

By and large, the city-state remains a humourless morality lesson as an economic success story, as a paternalistic and pragmatic modernity, and as a managed and generally benign multicultural society—one achieved through measures to separate peacefully the various communities (even if now complicated by the events of 11 September 2001) and create a measure of respect for differences in ethnicity and religion. It also notably increased equity in economic and social opportunities. Singapore also, as a consequence of the elevation of petit-bourgeois values, became a 'cultural desert' well known abroad as a land of shopping centres. Historical amnesia, the inevitable by-product of the modernisation process, is prominent and surpasses, one suspects, the level of dehistoricisation in Euro-American societies: the 'Now' of mass consumption dominates. In many ways, this radical experiment in modernising a small-scale Asian locality, a sort of hyper-modern petit-bourgeois modernity, is a unique one. As with Japan, beneath the assertions of the 'unique Japan' hypothesis of modernisation, the West has become a part of their 'Asian-ness'.⁴⁵

Singapore is unlikely in the middle term to become a first-rank Global City. Not only is it small, too much of its diversity has been homogenised. Nevertheless, it is a place remarkable for directly implementing a modernisation process that was less violent than it was historically in the West. The cultural, social and political costs that were paid, though, are real enough. It seems to be that the very nature of its 'success' that makes the city anathema to Western liberals. Can such a modernity truly be achieved and also sustained without a full political modernity of democratic freedoms? That question remains to be answered. Further, as Singapore increasingly strengthens its 'hub' location for multinational capitalist flows, the follow-

ing question will become pressing: can such a delocalised and dehistoricised site really be a society possessing 'national identity' dimensions? Who will 'truly' belong in Singapore?

Acknowledgements: This essay has benefited from discussions with Jean Comaroff, Benjamin K. S. Wong, Kwok Kian Woon and Ong Keng Sen. The opinions expressed are mine alone.

Notes

1. Renato Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis*, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1989), 217.
2. Achille Mbembe, 'Provisional Notes on the Postcolony', *Africa* 62, no. 1 (1992):3. Also see Jean and John L. Comaroff, 'Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse, and the Postcolonial State', *HAGAR: International Social Science Review* 1, no. 1 (2000): 12.
3. The title of volume 2 of former Singapore prime minister Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs is *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000* (Singapore: Times Media, 2000).
4. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 15.
5. C. J. W.-L. Wee, 'Capitalism and Ethnicity: Creating "Local" Culture in Singapore', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 1, no. 1 (April 2000): 129-43. A revised and expanded version appears as 'From Universal to Local Culture: The State, Ethnic Identity and Capitalism in Singapore', in C. J. W.-L. Wee (ed.), *Local Cultures and the 'New Asia': The State, Culture, and Capitalism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002).
6. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), xxi.
7. Fredric Jameson, *The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 212.
8. In 1968, then-prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, while addressing an audience at the then-University of Singapore, famously remarked: 'Poetry is a luxury we cannot afford.' Ten years' later, Lee's position had not changed much -nd this following 1978 quotation in retrospect warns us what was to come with the Asian values discourse: 'Literature and heritage or tradition are different altogether. What is important for pupils is not literature, but a philosophy of life... a value system.' (Cited in Shirley Geok-lin Lim, 'The English-Language Writer in Singapore', in *Singaporean Literature in English: A Critical Reader*, ed. Mohammad A. Quayum and Peter Wicks [Serdang: Universiti Putra Malaysia Press, 2002], 37.) The former prime minister was very public on the need for a larger value system during this period of the late 1970s-1980s (see 'Lee: Need for Value System', *Straits Times* [Singapore], 5 June 1978).

9. C. J. W.-L. Wee, 'Mediating "Progress": The National Narrative of Economic Development and Liberalism in Singapore', *Communal/Plural* 9, no. 2 (Oct. 2001): 223-242.
10. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1958).
11. Néstor García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity*, trans. Christopher L. Chiappari and Silvia L. López (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 41.
12. Architect Tay Kheng Soon, a long-time and acute critic of the PAP government's model of a deferential, pro-Western and bland modernity, claims that: 'In the contest between [socio-economic] modernization and modernity [by which he refers to the project of fostering individuated and critical consciousness through the arts and other areas of symbolic creation] within the imperatives of [the emerging post-independence] political economy, the incipient modernity which sprouted in [colonial] Malaya was sadly truncated by the impossibility of managing ethnic imaginations without a strong referee. Ideas of the modern could not be consciously articulated but were lived through the vectors of language and ethnicity; and modernity being sequestered from consciousness was therefore ambivalent. But for a small strategic English-educated elite in Malaya, modernity could not be articulated at all. Thus, this group saw that a certain adherence to the principle of meritocracy applied to racial equality, fair play, the autonomy of reason, a critical spirit etc., could be made to work despite the passions of the times [in post-war Malaya and Singapore].' The Chinese intelligentsia, Tay reminds his readers, were starting to 'develop an aesthetic of place in [their] growing output of works... The tragedy is that [anti-communist] political events prevented the growth of this new sentiment and in the independence movement and post-independence ideological struggles for political dominance, the tragic fault lines were drawn in such a manner that a shared modernity was impossible' (Tay Kheng Soon with Robbie B. H. Goh, 'Reading the Southeast Asian City in the Context of Rapid Economic Growth', in Robbie B. H. Goh and Brenda S. A. Yeoh [eds.], *Theorizing the Southeast Asian City as Text* [Singapore: World Scientific, 2003], 21; 21-22). Thus, there were incipient signs of cultural modernism on the island, but they had been mown down by the state by the late 1970s. (Also see William S. W. Lim, *Asian New Urbanism* [Singapore: Select Books, 1998].)
13. This is the position taken by Singapore sociologist Kian-Woon Kwok and his co-author, Kee-Hong Low: '... the opening chapter of Jacob Burkhardt's *The Civilization of Renaissance Italy* (1958) is titled "The State as a Work of Art." As rationalistic as the modernism of the Singapore state has been, it is also been culturally subversive, having the ambition of, on the one hand, working on the premise of a tabula rasa and, on the other hand, actively projecting the next necessary steps must be taken into a future that is already present' ('Cultural Policy and the City-State: Singapore and the "New Asian Renaissance"', in Diana Crane, Nobuko Kawashima and Ken'ichi Kawasaki [eds.], *Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy, and Globalization* [New York: Routledge, 2002], 164-65).
14. Cf. Clifford Geertz's 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Free Press, 1963): '... peoples of the new states are

simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives—... a search for an identity ... [and] a demand for progress' (108). 'Identity' for Geertz refers to 'the gross actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion, or tradition' (108). These are elements that the English-educated PAP leaders regarded as being unsuitable for first a Malayan and later a Singaporean identity, given the plural make-up of both colonial Malaya (later West Malaysia) and the island.

15. *Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates* 1, 12 April 1956, column 1910.
16. Viz. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. The larger framework for Singapore as a cultural-economic phenomenon would be the rise of the East and Southeast Asian trading economies. For a series of broader critical views on the re-inventions of the cartographic and other identities in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1980s and the 1990s, see the essays in Arif Dirlik (ed.), *What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
17. The review of cultural policy had begun with the *Report of the Advisory Council on Culture and the Arts* (Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1989), put together by (the late) Ong Teng Cheong et al. Ong was then the second deputy prime minister, and later became the president of Singapore.
18. The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (14-25 June 1993) was one of the notable clashes between (the clichéd idea of) Western 'individualism' and (the equally clichéd idea of) Asian 'collectivism', as the UN Conference followed in the wake of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration signed by Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and China. The central concern of this clash, as Jürgen Habermas has described it, was over 'the [East Asian] political community [being] more traditionally integrated more by duties than by [Western-style] rights. The political ethic recognizes no individual rights, but only rights that are conferred on individuals. For this reason, the individualistic legal understanding of the West is supposedly incompatible with the community-based ethos that is deeply anchored in a particular tradition and that requires individual conformity and subordination.' The real issue, however, Habermas feels, was more about 'the more or less "soft" authoritarianism that characterizes the dictatorships of developed nations... In reality, these [East Asian] governments do not defend individual rights at all, but rather a paternalistic care meant to allow them to restrict rights that in the West have been considered the most basic' (*The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, trans. Max Pensky [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001], 123, 124-25).
19. Vogel's expanded position on the economic development of the Little Tigers appeared as the 1990 Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures, published as *The Four Little Tigers: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
20. See Tu Wei-ming (ed.), *The Triadic Chord: Confucian Ethics, Industrial East Asia and Max Weber* (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1991) and also Tu Wei-ming (ed.), *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). At one point, the publications on an East Asian modernity became a minor publish-

- ing industry. I have argued that this modernity is more of a 'belated' modernity; see C. J. W.-L. Wee, 'The "Clash" of Civilizations? Or an Emerging "East Asian Modernity"?', *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 11, no. 2 (1996): 211-230.
21. Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and was expelled from the Federation in 1965.
 22. Gavan McCormack and Yushio Sugimoto, 'Introduction: Modernization and Beyond', in Gavan McCormack and Yushio Sugimoto (eds.), *The Japanese Trajectory: Modernization and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4.
 23. Japanese reaction to the policy was mixed; see Lim Hua Sing, *Japan's Role in ASEAN: Issues and Prospects* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1994), 1-26. Singapore, too, toyed with Japanese management techniques—e.g. Quality Control Circles (QCCs) were introduced. Lim's study gives a detailed analysis of the general economic relationship between Japan and ASEAN since the 1980s.
 24. Ogura Kazuo, 'A Call for a New Concept of Asia', *Japan Echo* 20, no.3 (Autumn 1993): 39.
 25. Saito Seiichirio, 'The Pitfalls of the New Asianism', *Japan Echo* 19, (1990: 14-19); also see Nakanishi Terumasa, 'Japan's Place in the World', *Japan Echo* 19, (1990: 2-5); Ogura, 'A Call': 37-44; Koichi Iwabuchi, 'Return to Asia? Japan in the Global Audio-Visual Market', *SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 9, no. 2, Special Issue on 'Mass Media: Local and Global Positions' (October 1994): 226-45; and Paul Blustein, 'Japan Swings Towards Asia Away From West', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 13 December 1994, 28 (reprinted from *Washington Post*).
 26. Nakanishi, 'Japan's Place': 3- 4.
 27. Iwabuchi, 'Return?': 227.
 28. Quoted by Saito, 'Pitfalls': 17. Ishihara is now the mayor of Tokyo.
 29. Ishihara Shintaro, 'Oppressed by the West, Japan's Return to Asia can Change Future', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 21 January 1995, 32.
 30. The scholarship now available in support of this position became quite profuse; here are a few examples: Hung-Chao Tai, *Confucianism and Economic Development* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute Press, 1989); Ronald P. Dore, *Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Peter L. Berger and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds.), *In Search of an East Asian Development Model* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988); Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation* (Princeton University Press, 1991); and Joseph P. L. Jiang (ed.), *Confucianism and Modernization: A Symposium* (Taipei: Wu Nan Publishing, 1987).
 31. Vogel, *Four Little Dragons*, 92.

32. 'Need for Asia "To Stress Morality" in Development: Values, Traditions Important in Economic Growth', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 28 October 1993, 13.
33. Anwar later fell out of favour with Dr Mahathir and was detained under Malaysia's Internal Security Act. He was later put on trial and is now in gaol. Dr Mahathir stepped down as prime minister at the end of 2003, and Abdullah Badawi is now the present prime minister.
34. See Yao Souchou, 'The Predicament of Modernity: Mass Media and the Making of the West in Southeast Asia', *Asian Journal of Communication* 4, no. 1 (1994): 33-51.
35. 'Is Everyone Here?', *Asiaweek*, 22 December 1993, 12.
36. Francis Deron, 'Confucius, Mao and Business', *Le Monde* section of *The Guardian Weekly*, 23 October 1994.
37. Vogel, *Four Little Dragons*, 90, 91
38. *Ibid.*, 92-101.
39. See Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan, 'State Fatherhood: The Politics of Sexuality, Nationalism and Race in Singapore', in *Nationalisms and Sexualities*, (ed.) Andrew Parker et al., (New York, Routledge, 1992).
40. Perry Anderson, *The Origins of Postmodernity* (London: Verso, 1998), p.134.
41. Jürgen Habermas, 'Modern and Postmodern Architecture', in *The New Conservatism Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate*, trans Shierry weber NicholSEN (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
42. Cf. Shalini Venturelli: 'What does this [Information Society] challenge involve in terms of public policy? It means an educational system that places emphasis on creative freedom and on incentives for independent thinking, state and private sector investment in research and technology, and how low levels of risk and high levels of reward for creative risk-taking in the workplace and the economy'. (*From the Information Economy to the Creative Economy: Moving Culture to the Center of International Public Policy* [Washington, D.C.: Center for the Arts and Culture, n.d.], 17 <<http://www.culturalpolicy.org>>).
43. 'Economic Development Board and Ministry of Information and the Arts, *Singapore: Global City for the Arts* (Singapore: Economic Development Board and Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1992)'.

